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Abstract
This paper analyzes the optimal provision of incentives in a sequential testing
context. In every period the agent can acquire costly information that is relevant to
the principal’s decision. Neither the agent’s e￿ort nor the realizations of his signals
are observable. First, we assume that the principal and the agent are symmetrically
informed at the time of contracting. We construct the optimal mechanism and show
that the agent is indi￿erent in every period between performing the test and sending
an uninformative message which continues the relationship. Furthermore, in the
￿rst period the agent is indi￿erent between carrying out his task and sending an
uninformative message which ends the relationship immediately. We then characterize
the optimal mechanisms when the agent has superior information at the outset of the
relationship. The principal prefers to o￿er di￿erent contracts if and only if the agent
types are su￿ciently diverse. Finally, all agent types bene￿t from their initial private
information.
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1 Introduction
In many situations the power to make a decision and the ability to acquire relevant informa-
tion do not reside in the same place. Firms, and more generally, decision makers routinely
consult experts who spend time and energy to determine the best course of actions.
Consider, for example, a ￿nancial institution that contemplates the possibility of invest-
ing in a pharmaceutical company. The future value of the company depends on whether
it will develop a new drug to treat a certain disease. The ￿nancial institution may hire an
expert (a scientist) to execute a number of costly tasks (perform independent tests, read
the scienti￿c literature, etc.) and ￿gure out whether the company will be successful or not.
Or consider a politician who has to take a stand on a controversial issue. The politician
prefers to support a certain position unless it alienates some of his constituency. Thus,
the politician seeks advice from a team of consultants. The consultants conduct a num-
ber of interviews to determine how the voters feel about the issue. Then they make a
recommendation.
To give a third and ￿nal example, suppose that a sports team has the possibility of
hiring a young player. It is not clear whether the player will turn out to be a star or not.
The team consults a professional sports scout. The expert tries to predict the player’s
future by analyzing his performances and comparing him to other players observed in the
past.
The above examples and most of the cases in which an expert (the agent) acquires
information on behalf of a decision maker (the principal) share some similarities. First, the
process of information acquisition is dynamic. Experts usually do not base their recommen-
dations on a single piece of evidence. On the contrary, they often accumulate information
and re￿ne their beliefs over several periods of time before advising the principal. Second,
the e￿ort that the agents exert to become informed and the evidence that they ￿nd are not
observable to the principal. It is di￿cult (if not impossible) for the principal to monitor
the agent and check that he carries out his task. Similarly, the principal may lack the
skills to interpret the agent’s ￿ndings correctly. Finally, the principal and the agent are not
equally informed at the beginning of their relationship. Because of his past experience the
agent may know facts that the principal ignores or he may interpret the publicly available
information in a more sophisticated way. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the
agent has superior information.
In spite of this, the principal can still motivate the agent to invest in information
acquisition and share his discoveries. In fact, after the principal makes a decision some
information becomes publicly available. In the above examples, it will become evident
whether the pharmaceutical company successfully develops the new drug, how the position
1taken by the politician a￿ects his popularity, or whether the young player is a star. The
goal of this paper is to study how the principal can use this information to overcome the
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection present in this context. In particular,
we analyze a dynamic mechanism design problem and characterize the principal’s optimal
contract. We also investigate how the di￿erent sources of private information a￿ect the
agent’s ability to extract a rent from the principal.
In our model, a principal has to make a risky decision by a certain deadline. The
unknown state of the world can be either good or bad. The principal hires an agent to
perform a number of costly tests. The agent can complete at most one test in every period.
Each test generates an informative (binary) signal about the state. One realization of the
signal can be observed only when the state is good, while the other realization is possible
under both states.
Our signal structure ￿ts well in many situations, like the examples mentioned above,
where it is possible to ￿nd de￿nitive evidence in favor of a certain state. For example, a
scientist who discovers that the drug has serious side e￿ects can safely conclude that it will
not be produced. The politician’s uncertainty is resolved once the experts become aware
of voters who strongly oppose the suggested position. In our third example, only a very
talented player can o￿er an exceptional performance. However, even great players perform
poorly in some occasions.1
The principal has the ability to commit to a mechanism. This is a contract which
speci￿es all the possible payments to the agent. The payments depend on the agent’s
messages and on the state of the world which is realized after the principal makes his
decision. The payments cannot depend on the agent’s e￿ort or on the realizations of the
signals since these are not observable (or they are observable but not veri￿able). Both the
principal and the agent are risk neutral. However, the agent is protected by limited liability
and cannot make transfers to the principal. Thus, it is impossible to sell the project to the
agent. The goal of the principal is to o￿er the cheapest contract that induces the agent
to acquire the signal and reveal it truthfully in every period until the deadline or until the
agent ￿nds de￿nitive evidence in favor of the good state, whichever comes ￿rst (clearly,
information acquisition becomes useless once the agent is certain that the state is good).
Since neither the e￿ort nor the signals are observable, the principal’s contract must
prevent di￿erent types of deviations. In particular, the agent may lie about the realizations
of his signals. By controlling the release of information, the agent therefore decides when to
terminate the relationship with the principal. If later payments are su￿ciently generous,
1For reasons of exposition, we refer to the states and the signals as \good" or \bad" but these labels
have no intrinsic meaning. As our examples suggest, depending on the particular application that one has
in mind it could be more appropriate to identify as good one state (signal) or the other.
2the agent may decide to delay the announcement of a major ￿nding. Furthermore, the
agent can choose the pace of his testing in the sense that he can shirk in one or several
periods. This leads to asymmetric beliefs about the state. Suppose that the agent shirks
and announces a message in favor of the bad state. Compared to the agent, the principal is
more pessimistic that the state is good. In fact, the two players interpret the same message
di￿erently. While the principal believes that the message re￿ects the signal accurately, the
agent is clearly aware that it carries no informational content.
To ease the exposition and to develop some intuition, we start with the simpler case
in which the agent has no private information at the outset of the relationship. In other
words, the principal and the agent start the game with the same prior about the state.
Without loss of generality, we restrict attention to contracts in which the agent receives a
payment only when the relationship ends. This can occur in any period t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1
if the agent announces a message in favor of the good state. Otherwise the relationship
ends in the ￿nal period T ￿ 1: Thus, a contract consists of T + 2 possible payments. For
t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1; there is the payment that the agent receives in t if he announces, in
that period, that the state is good and he is right. Furthermore, there are two additional
payments in the last period, one for each state. These are the payments that the agent
receives when all his messages are in favor of the bad state.
We show that the optimal contract is unique and we characterize it. The contract is such
that in every period the agent is indi￿erent between carrying out the test (and revealing its
realization) and sending an uninformative message in favor of the bad state. Furthermore,
in the ￿rst period the agent is indi￿erent between the equilibrium strategy (i.e., acquiring
and revealing the signal in every period) and guessing that the state is good. However,
the agent has a strict incentive to reveal his information as soon as he discovers de￿nitive
evidence in favor of the good state.
The agent obtains a positive information rent which can be divided into two components.
The ￿rst component is due to the presence of moral hazard, i.e. the fact that the principal
cannot monitor the agent’s e￿ort. The second component is due to the presence of hidden
information, i.e. the fact that the results of the tests are unobservable.2 We investigate
how the various parameters of the problem a￿ect the two rents. In particular, the moral
hazard rent is increasing in the quality of the signal, while the hidden information rent is
decreasing. When the signal becomes more precise the agent’s belief that the state is good
deteriorates more quickly over time. Thus, the principal needs to make larger payments in
2We follow Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and use the term \hidden information" to emphasize the
fact that the informational asymmetry about the realizations of the signals arises after the contract is
signed. In contrast, in standard models of adverse selection the agent is privately informed at the time of
contracting.
3the later periods to motivate the agent to execute the test. Because of these larger payments
near the deadline, the agents ￿nd it more pro￿table to shirk in the initial periods. And
larger incentives to deviate translate into larger moral hazard rents. On the other hand,
when the precision of the signal is high it is very risky for the agent to guess that the state
is good. It is much safer to acquire the signal and make a very accurate prediction of the
state. Consequently, the signal accuracy tends to decrease the hidden information rent.
In the second part of the paper, we analyze the case in which the agent has superior
information at the time of contracting. For tractability, we assume that the agent has one
of two types. The agent’s type represents his belief that the state is good and can be either
high or low. In this case the mechanism consists of a pair of contracts, one for each type.
The contract of the low type is almost identical to the optimal contract when the prior
of the low type is known to the principal. Only the payment in the bad state is distorted
upwards. All the other payments coincide under the two contracts. This implies that the
low type continues to be indi￿erent between working and shirking in every period. On the
other hand, all the payments to the high type in the good state are distorted upwards.
Moreover, he has a strict incentive to execute the test in every period.
We show that when the priors of the two types are su￿ciently close to each other the
principal prefers to o￿er the same contract to both types. However, when the distance
between the priors is su￿ciently large the principal prefers to separate the two types and
o￿ers two di￿erent contracts. In any case, the information rent of each type is strictly
larger than the rent obtained when the prior is known to the principal. That is, the new
source of private information generates an additional rent. In contrast to many models
of adverse selection in which the principal is able to extract all the rents from a certain
type (see, among others, Mussa and Rosen (1978), and Baron and Myerson (1982)), in our
model both types strictly bene￿t from the fact that their initial type is private information.
Our study is closely related to Gromb and Martimort (2007) who analyze a similar
problem of delegated expertise. In Gromb and Martimort (2007) there are two noisy
signals that can be observed before the principal makes a decision. The principal does not
have direct access to them. Instead, he must hire one or two experts to acquire and report
the signals. As in our model, moral hazard, hidden information and limited liability are
all features of the agency problem. The principal can either hire one expert to acquire two
signals or he can hire two experts to acquire one signal each. Gromb and Martimort compare
the two organizational forms under various forms of collusion. In contrast, in this paper
the principal hires a single expert and tries to induce him to acquire an arbitrary number
of signals. Our focus is on the dynamics of the optimal contract and on the provision of
intertemporal incentives. Furthermore, we consider the case of adverse selection while in
Gromb and Martimort (2007) the principal and the experts are symmetrically informed at
4the time of contracting.3
This paper contributes to the extensive literature on dynamic agency. Initial contribu-
tions such as Green (1987), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), Spear and Srivastava (1987)
and Atkenson (1991) focus on moral hazard. In every period, the agent’s unobservable
action a￿ects the probability distribution of the observable outcome. The literature has
also analyzed the case in which the agent receives private information over time. For ex-
ample, DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), Biais, Mariotti, Plantin, and Rochet (2007), and
DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) consider dynamic contracting environments in which the
agent (entrepreneur) privately observes the cash ￿ows of a certain project. The probability
distribution of the cash ￿ows is publicly known and, thus, there is no learning. In contrast,
the interaction among learning, moral hazard and adverse selection (the initial information
asymmetry) is a key element in our analysis.
Among the articles that analyze the e￿ect of learning in dynamic agency, Bergemann
and Hege (1998, 2005) are particular close to our work, especially in terms of informa-
tion structure. They study the provision of venture capital. The quality of the project
is unknown to the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. The successful completion of
the project depends both on its quality and the volume of ￿nancing it receives. Investing
without success induces the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist to lower their expec-
tations about the quality of the project. The entrepreneur controls the allocation of the
funds which is, therefore, subject to moral hazard. There are three di￿erences between
Bergemann and Hege (1998, 2005) and our study. First, the outcome of the entrepreneur’s
investment is veri￿able. In particular, the entrepreneur cannot generate a success unless he
invests in the project. In contrast, in our model the agent invests in information acquisition
and the realization of the signal is private information. Therefore, the agent can guess that
the state is good. Second, we allow for the possibility that the principal and the agent are
asymmetrically informed at the time of contracting. In our context, a mechanism must give
incentives to the agent to reveal his initial information. Such incentives are also absent in
the venture capital model. The third di￿erence concerns who has the bargaining power.
In Bergemann and Hege (1998, 2005), there is a competitive market of venture capitalists
and the entrepreneur (i.e., the agent) has all the bargaining power. In contrast, we assume
that the principal chooses the mechanism to maximize his welfare.
DeMarzo and Sannikov (2008) study a dynamic model in which the investor and the
agent (who are equally informed at the outset of the relationship) learn over time about
the pro￿tability of the ￿rm. The two players have di￿erent beliefs if the agent diverts
the resources of the ￿rm to private ends. The goal of the paper is to design the optimal
3We also use a di￿erent information structure. Our optimal contract with two signals (and no adverse
selection) di￿ers from the optimal sequential contract with one expert of Gromb and Martimort (2007).
5dynamic contract. Manso (2007) studies a principal-agent model of experimentation. In
each period the agent can choose among di￿erent activities. The productivity of one of
them is unknown. In the ￿rst period the agent can experiment, i.e. he can choose the
innovative activity to learn about its productivity. The random outcome of each activity
is veri￿able. Manso constructs the optimal contract that induces experimentation.
In our model, the principal’s ￿nal decision depends entirely on the messages announced
by the agent. In other words, the principal delegates his decision to the (potentially)
better informed agent. La￿ont and Tirole (1986) assume that the agent has superior
information at the time of contracting and study delegation in a static model. Lewis and
Sappington (1997), and Cremer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998) consider the case of costly
information acquisition. In a recent paper, Lewis and Ottaviani (2008) extend the analysis
to a dynamic setting. Lewis and Ottaviani analyze a model in which the principal o￿ers
short-term contracts to motivate the agent to search for innovations. They allow for the
possibility that the agent’s information is partially veri￿able, so that the agent has the
opportunity to conceal discoveries.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model when the prior
is commonly known and characterize the optimal mechanism. In Section 3, we analyze the
case in which the agent’s prior is private information. Section 4 concludes. All the proofs
are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model with Symmetric Initial Information
A risk neutral principal has to choose one of two risky actions: A = B;G: The payo￿ of
each action depends on the state of the world which we assume to be binary: ! = B;G:
The principal’s preferred action in state ! = B;G is A = !: The prior probability that the
state is ! = G is denoted by p0 2 (0;1):
The principal can make his decision (i.e., choose between B and G) in any period
t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1; T > 2:4 In period 0 the principal can hire an agent to perform a number
of tests. In this section, we assume that the agent does not have any private information
at the outset of the game. Thus, in period 0 the principal and the agent share the same
prior p0:
The agent can perform at most one test in each period. Performing a test is costly
and we let c > 0 denote the cost of a single test. Every test generates an informative but
noisy signal s about the state. The signal takes the value s = B;G and has the following
4We consider the case T = 1 at the end of Subsection 2.2.
6distribution:
Pr(s = Gj! = G) = ￿
Pr(s = Gj! = B) = 0
where ￿ 2 (0;1) denotes the quality of the signal. Thus, the signal G provides de￿nitive
evidence in favor of state G: Conditional on the state, the signals are independent across
periods.
For every t = 0;:::;T; we let
pt =
p0 (1 ￿ ￿)
t
p0 (1 ￿ ￿)
t + 1 ￿ p0
(1)
denote the agent’s belief that the state is ! = G if he observes t signals equal to B: To make
the problem interesting we assume that the agent’s signals are bene￿cial to the principal.
That is, given the belief pT the principal prefers to choose action B:
The two actions of the agent are denoted by e (acquiring the signal) and ne (not
acquiring the signal). The agent’s e￿ort decision (whether he chooses e or ne) and the
realization of the signal are not observable. The goal of the principal is to induce the
agent to acquire the signal and to reveal it in every period t 6 T ￿ 1; until the agent ￿nds
de￿nitive evidence s = G in favor of the state G. The principal can commit to a long term
contract (or mechanism) w; specifying sequential payments to the agent that are contingent
on the agent’s messages and on the state of the world (of course, a payment may depend
on the state only if it is made after the principal chooses an action A = B;G and the state
is observed).
The agent is risk neutral and has limited liability in the sense that the principal’s pay-
ments must be non-negative. For simplicity, we assume that the agent has zero reservation
utility. Both the principal and the agent have the same discount factor ￿ 2 (0;1]:
The objective of the principal is to design the optimal mechanism, i.e. the cheapest
contract w that induces the agent to exert e￿ort and reveal the realization of the signal in
every period t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1, until he observes the signal G. In this case we say that the
contract is incentive compatible.
The length of the contract T is given and is not a part of the mechanism. There are
two di￿erent reasons why it is interesting to adopt this approach. First, suppose that there
is a certain deadline T ￿ 1 by which the principal has to choose between the two risky
actions B and G: If the marginal bene￿t of a signal in period t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1 is much
larger than the cost of the signal c; then it is indeed optimal for the principal to motivate
the agent to work in every period. Second, if the length of the contract is endogenous,
the optimal mechanism can be computed in two steps. In the ￿rst step we determine the
7optimal contract for any given length. In the second step we compute the optimal length
by comparing the principal’s expected payo￿s under contracts of di￿erent lengths. The
analysis below shows how to solve the ￿rst and more challenging step. We discuss the
second step at the end of Subsection 2.2.
We are now ready to provide a formal de￿nition of a contract. Recall that the contract
is designed to give incentives to the agent to exert e￿ort in every period (until he observes
the signal G). It is therefore without loss of generality to assume that the set of messages
available to the agent in every period is fB;Gg: Thus, a contract w is the collection of the
following non-negative payments:
w =
￿
(wG (t;G);wG (t;B))
T￿1
t=0 ;(wB (t))
T￿2
t=0 ;wB (T ￿ 1;G);wB (T ￿ 1;B)
￿
As soon as the agent announces message G the principal chooses action G and makes
a payment contingent on the state. Then the contract ends. Therefore, the contract
reaches period t > 1 only if the agent announces message B in every period t0 < t: For
t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1; wG (t;G) and wG (t;B) denote the payments that the agent receives in
period t if he announces message G and the state is G or B; respectively. For t = 0;:::;T￿2;
wB (t) is the payment that the agent receives in period t if he announces message B (in
this case the principal does not make a decision and the state is not observed). Finally,
wB (T ￿ 1;G) and wB (T ￿ 1;B) denote the payments that the agent receives in period
T ￿ 1 if he announces message B and the state is G or B; respectively.
To sum up, we consider the following game. In period 0 the principal o￿ers a contract
w: Because the agent has zero reservation utility and limited liability the participation
constraints are automatically satis￿ed and the agent accepts the contract. Then in each
period the agent decides whether to exert e￿ort (action e) or not (action ne) and sends a
message from the set fB;Gg: The game ends either when the agent announces message G
or in period T ￿ 1 if the agent always reports message B:
We can now de￿ne the agent’s strategies. In every period the agent observes the private
history of acquisition decisions and signal realizations as well as the public history of reports.
Clearly, there is only one public history that is relevant in period t: This is the history in
which the agent announces message B in every period t0 < t: We can therefore restrict
attention to private histories (and ignore public histories).
Consider an arbitrary period. If the agent exerts e￿ort then he can either observe the
signal B or the signal G: On the other hand, if the agent shirks we say that he observes ne
(his decision). Thus, for any t > 0; Ht = fne;B;Gg
t is the set of private histories at the
beginning of period t (or, equivalently, at the end of period t￿1). We set H0 equal to the
empty set.
8We let ￿ denote an arbitrary (pure) strategy. Formally, ￿ =
￿
￿A
t ;￿M
t
￿T￿1
t=0 ; where
￿A
t : Ht ! fe;neg
￿M
t : Ht+1 ! fB;Gg
A strategy has two components: the action strategy and the message strategy. The
￿rst component
￿
￿A
t
￿T￿1
t=0 speci￿es the agent’s decisions at the information acquisition stage.
The second component
￿
￿M
t
￿T￿1
t=0 maps the private histories of the agents into reports to
the principal. We let ￿ denote the set of strategies available to the agents.
To simplify the exposition, we have de￿ned a strategy as a contingent plan of actions.
However, the o￿-path behavior of a strategy (what the agent does after he deviates) does
not play any role in the analysis. This is because the principal commits to a mechanism
in period 0 and cannot react to the agent’s choices. In particular, all the strategies that
induce the same on-path behavior (but di￿erent o￿-path behavior) are equivalent in the
sense that they all generate the same outcome.
We denote by ￿￿ the set of strategies under which the agent acquires the signal and
reveals it truthfully in every period (on path). Formally, ￿￿ is the set of all strategies ￿
such that: (i) ￿A
0 = e; (ii) for every t > 0
￿
A
t (B;:::;B) = e
and (iii) for every t > 0 and every s = B;G
￿
M
t (B;:::;B;s) = s
Given a contract w, we let u(￿;p0;w) denote the agent’s expected utility in period 0 if
he follows the strategy ￿.5 Clearly, if ￿ and ￿0 are two strategies in ￿￿; then u(￿;p0;w) =
u(￿0;p0;w): With a slight abuse of notation, we let u(w) = u(￿;p0;w) with ￿ 2 ￿￿:
Then the principal’s (linear programming) problem is given by
min
w>0
u(w)
s.t. u(w) > u(￿;p0;w) for every ￿ 2 ￿
(2)
A contract is incentive compatible if it satis￿es all the constraints in (2). The optimal
contract is the solution to the above problem.
5In the next section we consider the case in which the agent’s prior is private information. For this
reason it is convenient to make explicit the dependence of the agent’s utility on the prior p0:
92.1 The Optimal Mechanism
We start the analysis with a simple observation. Suppose that w is an incentive compatible
mechanism and wG (t;B) > 0 for some t. Recall that wG (t;B) is the payment that the
agent receives when he announces the message G and the state is B: If the agent acquires
the signal and reveals it in every period, then he receives wG (t;B) with probability zero.
Consider now a new mechanism w0 which is identical to w except that we set w0
G (t;B) = 0:
Clearly, u(w0) = u(w) and u(￿;p0;w0) 6 u(￿;p0;w) for every ￿ 2 ￿: Thus, the new
contract w0 is also incentive compatible.
It is therefore optimal to set wG (t;B) = 0 for every t: This result is very intuitive.
Making a positive transfer wG (t;B) to the agent does not provide incentives to acquire
and reveal the signal. On the contrary, such a transfer makes it more pro￿table to deviate
and choose a strategy outside ￿￿: Thus, in what follows we restrict attention to mechanisms
w such that wG (t;B) = 0 for every t.6
We now introduce an important class of mechanisms. We say that a contract is evidence-
based if wB (t) = 0 for every t = 0;:::;T ￿ 2: As the name suggests, in an evidence-based
contract the payments are made only when the game ends and they are contingent on the
state.
In the rest of the section we proceed as follows. First, we show that it is without loss
of generality to focus on evidence-based mechanisms. More precisely, we demonstrate that
if there is an optimal mechanism then there is also an optimal evidence-based mechanism.
Then we construct the optimal evidence-based mechanism. Finally, we show that any
optimal mechanism must be evidence-based.
Suppose that w is an optimal contract. Consider now the evidence-based mechanism
w0 de￿ned as follows. We let w0
G (0;G) = wG (0;G) and
w
0
G (t;G) = wG (t;G) +
￿
1
￿
￿t
wB (0) + :::
￿
1
￿
￿
wB (t ￿ 1) (3)
for every t = 1;:::;T ￿ 1:
Finally, for ! = B;G we let
w
0
B (T ￿ 1;!) = wB (T ￿ 1;!) +
￿
1
￿
￿T￿1
wB (0) + :::
￿
1
￿
￿
wB (T ￿ 2) (4)
6Of course, if w is an incentive compatible mechanism and all the constraints in which the payment
wG (t;B) appears are satis￿ed with strict inequalities, then we can increase the value of wG (t;B) by a
small amount and the new mechanism is still incentive compatible. In fact, it is easy to construct optimal
mechanisms w with wG (t;B) > 0 for some t: In our opinion, these mechanisms are not particularly
interesting since their distinctive feature is to make the agent’s deviations more valuable.
10It is immediate to check that u(￿;p0;w0) = u(￿;p0;w) for every strategy ￿ 2 ￿: For
every outcome of the game, the agent receives the same discounted sum of payments under
the two contracts. In the case of w; the principal makes positive intermediate payments
(i.e., payments before the game ends). Under the contract w0 the principal pays the agent
only when the game ends. However, the principal gives back all the intermediate payments
of w plus the interests on those payments. Clearly, the agent is completely indi￿erent
between the two scenarios.
In what follows we restrict attention to evidence-based contracts. To simplify the ex-
position, we refer to them simply as contracts (or mechanisms). At this point it is also
convenient to simplify the notation. With a slight abuse of notation we de￿ne an (evidence-
based) contract w as the collection of the following payments
w =
￿
(w(t))
T￿1
t=0 ;w(G);w(B)
￿
For t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1; w(t) is the payment that the agent receives in period t if he
announces message G and the state is G: For ! = B;G; w(!) is the payment that the
agent receives in period T ￿ 1 if he announces message B and the state is equal to !:
In principle, an incentive compatible mechanism has to satisfy a large number of con-
straints since the agent may shirk and lie in one or several periods. The next lemma
simpli￿es the analysis dramatically. Lemma 1 below identi￿es a much smaller set of con-
straints which are su￿cient to guarantee incentive compatibility. In particular, we can
safely ignore multiple deviations and restrict attention to one-period deviations.7
In order to state our next result we need to introduce some additional notation. Fix
a contract w. Consider period t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1; and suppose that the agent’s belief (that
the state is ! = G) is equal to p 2 [0;1]: With another minor abuse of notation we let
u(t;p;w) denote the agent’s expected utility, computed in period t; when he acquires and
reveals the signal in every period t0 > t:
u(t;p;w) = p￿w(t) + p(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿w(t + 1) + ::: + p(1 ￿ ￿)
T￿1￿t ￿￿
T￿1￿tw(T ￿ 1)+
p(1 ￿ ￿)
T￿t ￿
T￿1￿tw(G) + (1 ￿ p)￿
T￿1￿tw(B)￿
c
h
1 + ￿ (p(1 ￿ ￿) + 1 ￿ p) + ::: + ￿
T￿1￿t
￿
p(1 ￿ ￿)
T￿1￿t + 1 ￿ p
￿i
Notice that u(0;p0;w) = u(w): We also let u(T;p;w); p 2 [0;1]; be given by:
u(T;p;w) =
1
￿
[pw(G) + (1 ￿ p)w(B)] (5)
7We should perhaps point out that this result is not an application of the one-shot deviation principle.
Clearly, the objective of the principal is not to ￿nd the strategy in ￿￿ that is sequentially rational. In
fact, as it will become evident from Lemma 1, we only consider one-period deviations from the on-path
behavior.
11For notational simplicity, we drop the argument w in u(t;p;w) and u(￿;p0;w) when
there is no ambiguity.
Lemma 1 A contract w is incentive compatible if and only if it satis￿es the following
constraints:
u(0;p0;w) > p0w(0) (6)
u(t;pt;w) > ￿u(t + 1;pt;w); t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1 (7)
w(t) > ￿w(t + 1); t = 0;:::;T ￿ 2 (8)
We say that the agent guesses the state G in a certain period t if in that period he
shirks and announces the message G: The constraint (6) guarantees that the agent does
not guess the state G in period 0. The constraints (7) consider one-period deviations. The
agent cannot ￿nd it pro￿table to shirk and announce the message B in a single period (in
all the remaining periods the agent acquires and reveals the signal). Finally, because of
the constraints (8), the agent does not want to delay the announcement of the message G
once he discovers that the true state is indeed G: Not surprisingly, an incentive compatible
mechanism must necessarily satisfy the constraints (6)-(8).
It is certainly more interesting to see why the constraints (6)-(8) provide su￿cient
conditions for incentive compatibility. It follows from constraint (7) for t = T ￿1 that the
agent prefers to tell the truth if he discovers in period T ￿ 1 that the true state is G: This
and the fact that he discounted sequence of payments
￿
￿
tw(t)
￿T￿1
t=0 is (weakly) decreasing
imply that it is optimal for the agent to announce the message G as soon as he observes
the signal G: In other words, our constraints guarantee that agent does not lie after the
signal G: Can the agent lie after the signal B? The answer is no. Acquiring the signal
and lying after B means that the agent ignores his signal (and sends the message G). But
then it would be more pro￿table to shirk, save the cost c and send the message G: We can
therefore restrict attention to the strategies under which the agent reveals truthfully the
realization of all the signals he acquires.
The next step is to show that another class of strategies can be ignored. Consider a
strategy ^ ￿ under which the agent guesses the state G in some period ^ t > 0: This strategy is
weakly dominated by the strategy ￿0 under which the agent guesses the state G in the ￿rst
period. Both strategies are such that the agent receives a positive payment if and only if
the state is G: However, under the strategy ￿0 the agent receives the payment w(0) in the
￿rst period and does not exert any e￿ort. Under the strategy ^ ￿ the agent may receive the
payment after the ￿rst period and he may have to exert e￿ort. Since e￿ort is costly and
the discounted sequence of payments
￿
￿
tw(t)
￿T￿1
t=0 is decreasing, the agent weakly prefers
￿0 to ^ ￿:
12Once we rule out the \guessing" strategies similar to ^ ￿ above, we are left with strategies
under which the agent can do two things in every period. He can either acquire the signal
and reveal it truthfully, or he can shirk and send the message B: The constraints (7) tell
us that the strategies under which the agent shirks in a single period do not constitute
pro￿table deviations. It turns out that those constraints have stronger implications and
are enough to prevent deviations under which the agent shirks in several periods.
To give some intuition, let us consider the agent in period t: Among the remaining
discounted payments that the agent can receive in state G; w(t) is the largest one. However,
the agent can get this payment only if he acquires the signal in period t (recall that we have
restricted attention to strategies under which the agent announces G only if he observes
the signal G). Consider two di￿erent scenarios. In the ￿rst scenario, the agent has acquired
the signal in every period t0 < t: The constraint (7), evaluated at t; implies that given the
belief pt the agent is willing to pay the cost c to have a chance to receive the payment
w(t): In the second scenario the agent has shirked at least once before t. In period t his
belief is larger than pt: Therefore, the agent is more optimistic that he will receive the large
payment w(t) than under the ￿rst scenario. In other words, in the second scenario the
agent has a strict incentive to exert e￿ort. Thus, we conclude that if it is not pro￿table for
the agent to shirk once, then, a fortiori, it will not be pro￿table to shirk several times.
Given Lemma 1 we can restate the principal’s problem as
min
w>0
u(w)
s.t. (6)-(8)
We let w￿ (p0) =
￿
(w￿ (t;p0))
T￿1
t=0 ;w￿ (G;p0);w￿ (B;p0)
￿
denote the optimal (evidence-
based) mechanism when the prior is p0. Again, to simplify the notation we drop the
argument p0 in w￿ (p) when there is no ambiguity.
The next proposition characterizes the optimal contract. In the proposition and in the
rest of the paper we adopt the following convention: if the lower bound of a summation is
strictly larger than the upper bound then the summation is equal to zero.
Proposition 1 The optimal contract is
w￿ (t) = c
￿pt + c
T￿1 P
t0=t+1
￿
t0￿t
￿
1
pt0 ￿ 1
￿
; t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1
w￿ (G) = 0
w￿ (B) = c
￿(1￿p0)￿T￿1 + c
T￿2 P
t0=0
￿
￿t0
(9)
13Under the optimal contract the agent is indi￿erent between acquiring and revealing the
signal in every period and guessing the state G in the ￿rst period. Moreover, suppose that
the agent has acquired and revealed the signal in every period t0 < t. Suppose also that
the agent plans to adopt the same behavior in every period t0 > t: Then in period t the
agent is indi￿erent between shirking (and announcing B) and acquiring and revealing the
signal. In other words, the constraints (7) are all binding under the optimal mechanism.
Finally, the principal sets the payment w￿ (G) equal to zero. Therefore, the agent receives
a payment only when his message matches the state of the world.
In the proof of Proposition 1 we solve a relaxed problem in which we ignore the non-
negativity constraints and the constraints (8). We show that the remaining constraints (6)
and (7) must be binding.
The agent receives w(B) only if the state is B: Thus, the probability of receiving this
payment is the same for all the strategies under which the agent is truthful when he acquires
the signal and announces the message B when he shirks. In other words, w(B) does not
appear in the constraints (7). The only role of w(B) is to prevent the agent from guessing
the state G in the ￿rst period. Clearly, the principal will choose it to make the agent
indi￿erent. That is, the constraint (6) will bind.
Suppose that in a certain period t > 0 the agent has a strict incentive to acquire the
signal. Suppose now that the principal lowers the the payment w(t) by a small amount
". Clearly this will not a￿ect the incentive in every period t0 > t: Also, if " is su￿ciently
small then the agent will continue to acquire the signal in period t: Now, let us consider a
period t0 < t: The probability (computed in period t0) that the agent receives the payment
w(t) is smaller if the agent acquires the signal in t0 than if he shirks (if the agent acquires
the signal in t0 he could observe the signal G and the game would end). Thus, by reducing
the payment w(t) the principal gives more incentive to the agent to exert e￿ort in period
t0 < t: Clearly, a lower value w(t) reduces the expected utility that the agent obtains when
he acquires and reveals the signal in every period. This could induce the agent to guess
the state G in the ￿rst period. However, if the principal also lowers the payment w(0);
the \guessing" strategy will become less appealing. In fact, it turns out that it is possible
to lower both w(t) and w(0) in such a way that all the constraints are still satis￿ed. Thus
the solution to the relaxed problem satis￿es all the constraints (7) with equality.8 In a very
similar way, we show that it is optimal for the principal to set the payment w(G) equal to
zero.
Thus, the solution to the relaxed problem is the solution to a linear system with T + 2
8If the agent has a strict incentive to acquire the signal in t = 0, then it is enough to lower (by a small
amount) the payment w(0): This will still give an incentive to the agent to acquire the signal in the ￿rst
period and it will make the \guessing" strategy less pro￿table.
14equations (the constraints (6) and (7) and the equation w(G) = 0) and T + 2 unknowns
(w(0);:::;w(T ￿ 1);w(G);w(B)). The unique solution to the system is the contract w￿
de￿ned in equation (9) which satis￿es the non-negativity constraints and, furthermore, has
the following feature:
w
￿ (t) = ￿w
￿ (t + 1) +
c(1 ￿ ￿)
pt￿
for t = 0;:::;T ￿2:9 Therefore, the contract w￿ satis￿es the constraints (8) and is optimal.
So far we have shown that w￿ is the unique optimal contract in the class of evidence-
based mechanisms. We now show that the uniqueness result holds for the whole class of
mechanisms. To see this, suppose that w is an optimal contract and that wB (t) > 0 for
some t = 0;:::;T ￿2: Given w; let w0 denote the corresponding evidence-based mechanism
constructed according to equations (3) and (4). By construction w0 is an optimal evidence-
based mechanism. Notice, however, that w0 (G) > 0 because wB (t) > 0 for some t: But
this contradicts the fact that w￿ is the unique optimal evidence-based mechanism (recall
that w￿ (G) = 0). We conclude that the optimal contract is unique and is evidence-based.
2.2 The Agent’s Information Rent
Recall that the optimal contract w￿ satis￿es the constraint (6) with equality. Thus, the
agent’s expected payo￿ under w￿ can be easily computed:
u(w
￿) = p0w
￿ (0) =
c
￿
+ c(1 ￿ p0)
T￿1 X
t=1
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿t
This is the information rent that the principal has to pay to motivate the agent to work
and be honest. In our model the agent has two sources of private information since both
his action and his signal are unobservable. Thus, the information rent can be divided into
two components: a moral hazard component and a hidden information component. To see
this, consider a variant of our model in which the signal is veri￿able (if the agent shirks
then he and the principal observe the signal B with probability one). This is a model with
moral hazard but no hidden information. It is straightforward to show that in this case
the optimal contract is identical to w￿ except that the payment w(B) is equal to zero.10 In
contrast, in our model w￿ (B) > 0 and the agent receives it in period T ￿1 with probability
9An additional feature of the optimal contract is that the sequence of payments fw￿ (t)g
T￿1
t=0 is increasing
over time if ￿ < 1 (the sequence is constant if ￿ = 1). For brevity, we omit the proof of this result.
10When the realization of the signal is veri￿able, a contract is incentive compatible if and only if it
satis￿es the constraints (7).
151 ￿ p0 (if the state is B). Thus, the discounted expected utility of w￿ (B) represents the
hidden information component of the agent’s information rent and is equal to
￿
T￿1 (1 ￿ p0)w
￿ (B) =
c
￿
+ c(1 ￿ p0)
T￿1 X
t=1
￿
t
The di￿erence between u(w￿) and the expression above
u(w
￿) ￿ ￿
T￿1 (1 ￿ p0)w
￿ (B) = c(1 ￿ p0)
T￿1 X
t=1
￿
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿t
represents the moral hazard component of the information rent.
The information rent u(w￿) is a U-shaped function of the signal quality ￿; and goes to
in￿nity both when ￿ is close to zero and when ￿ is close to one. This re￿ects the combined
e￿ect that the signal quality has on the two components.
The moral hazard rent is increasing in ￿: To give some intuition, suppose for a moment
that the agent’s e￿ort and his signal are veri￿able. Consider a certain period t and let
pt (de￿ned in equation (1)) denote the common belief. In this case it is enough to pay
c=￿pt upon observing the signal G to motivate the agent to work. The ratio pt=pt+1 is
increasing in ￿. Thus, as ￿ grows the ratio between the payment in t+1 and the payment
in t increases. Consider the payments c=￿pt and c=￿pt+1 but now assume that the e￿ort
of the agent is not observable. Clearly, the higher ￿; the higher the incentives of the agent
to shirk in t in order to get the larger payment in t+1: Because of this, the principal must
give a higher information rent to the agent when the quality of the signal improves.
On the other hand, the hidden information rent is decreasing in ￿: Under the optimal
contract w￿ the agent is rewarded only if his messages and the state coincide. When the
quality of the signal is high it is risky to guess the state G in the ￿rst period. The agent
can pay the cost c and ￿nd out, with high probability, the correct state. Thus when ￿ is
large a low value of w￿ (B) is su￿cient to prevent the agent from deviating to a guessing
strategy.
The comparative statics with respect to the remaining parameters of the model coincide
for the two components of the information rent. The ratio pt=pt+1 is decreasing in p0: Thus,
if we start with the payments c=￿pt and c=￿pt+1 of the model with observable e￿ort, the
agent’s incentives to shirk in t (in order to get the reward in t + 1) become stronger when
the state G becomes less likely (p0 decreases). Therefore, the payments (w￿ (t))
T￿1
t=0 and
the moral hazard rent are decreasing in p0: This, in turn, makes it more pro￿table for the
agent to guess the state G when that state is less likely. As a consequence, the hidden
information rent is also decreasing in p0:
16Finally, the information rent is increasing in c and ￿: By shirking in a certain period t
the agent saves the cost c but, at the same time, he eliminates the possibility of getting
a reward in t: Clearly, shirking is more pro￿table when the test is particularly costly or
when the agent becomes more patient. When c and ￿ are high the principal must reward
the agents with larger payments (w￿ (t))
T￿1
t=0 and a larger moral hazard rent. In turn, the
larger the payments (w￿ (t))
T￿1
t=0 ; the stronger the incentives to use a guessing strategy. It
follows that c and ￿ also have a positive impact on the hidden information rent.
As anticipated in Section 2, we now investigate the case in which the length of the
contract is endogenous. The principal chooses T to maximize his expected payo￿. To be
able to compare all possible lengths, we ￿rst need to describe the optimal contract when
T = 1: One can easily verify that
w￿ (0) = c
p￿; w￿ (G) = 0; w￿ (B) = c
(1￿p)￿
and the agent’s information rent is u(w￿) = c=￿:
For every T = 0;1;:::; let V (T) denote the principal’s discounted expected utility from
the decision when he can observe at most T signals. Also, let C (T) denote the discounted
expected cost of inducing the agent to acquire T signals. We have C (0) = ~ C (0) = 0 and
for every T > 1
C (T) = ~ C (T) + c
￿ + c(1 ￿ p0)
T￿1 P
t=1
￿
￿
1￿￿
￿t
~ C (T) = c + c
T￿1 P
t=1
￿
t ￿
p0 (1 ￿ ￿)
t + 1 ￿ p0
￿
where ~ C (T) denotes the expected cost of T signals when the principal has direct access to
them (or, equivalently, when the agent’s e￿ort is veri￿able).
The optimal length T ￿ maximizes V (T) ￿ C (T). As one would expect, T ￿ is (weakly)
smaller than the e￿cient length, i.e. the length that maximizes V (T)￿ ~ C (T): Because of
the presence of agency problems, testing is stopped too early and the gains of additional
signals are not realized.
3 Asymmetric Initial Information
In Section 2, we assume that the principal and the agent share the same prior p0 at the
beginning of the game. This is a restrictive assumption if the agent is an expert who has
been exposed to similar problems in the past. In such cases it seems natural to assume that
the principal and the agent enter their relationship with di￿erent levels of information. The
17goal of this section is to analyze how the principal motivates an informed agent to carry
out his task. In particular, we investigate how the additional source of private information
a￿ects the optimal mechanism and the agent’s information rent.
To allow the expert to possess initial information, we modify the model presented in
Section 2 and let the agent have a private type at the beginning of period 0: For tractability,
we assume that there are two possible types. With probability ￿ 2 (0;1) the agent is a
high type and believes that the state is G with probability ph
0 2 (0;1): With probability
1￿￿ the agent is a low type and believes that the state is G with probability p‘
0 2
￿
0;ph
0
￿
:
We denote the two types by their beliefs.
We assume that the number of available signals is T > 2:11 For k = h;‘ and t = 0;:::;T;
we let
p
k
t =
pk
0 (1 ￿ ￿)
t
pk
0 (1 ￿ ￿)
t + 1 ￿ pk
0
denote the agent’s belief that the state is G if his type is pk
0 and he observes t signals equal
to B:
As in Section 2, the principal tries to induce the agent to acquire and reveal the signal
in every period t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1 (until he observes the signal G). Since the agent has
private information about his type, a mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
consists of a pair of contracts,
one for each type. In this section, we focus on evidence-based mechanisms and, therefore,
wk =
￿￿
wk (t)
￿T￿1
t=0 ;wk (G);wk (B)
￿
; for k = h;‘:12
Thus, the game between the principal and the agent is as follows. In period 0; the
principal o￿ers a pair of contracts
￿
wh;w‘￿
and the agent chooses one. In every period
t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1; the agent decides whether to exert e￿ort or not and sends a message
from the set fB;Gg: The game ends as soon the agent announces the message G (or in
period T ￿1 if he reports the message B in every period). The agent receives the payment
speci￿ed by the contract that he chose.
If a mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
is incentive compatible, then it is optimal for the type pk
0;
k = h;‘; to choose the contract wk and to acquire and reveal the signal in every period.
The principal’s problem is to ￿nd the cheapest incentive compatible mechanism.
We say that a contract w =
￿
(w(t))
T￿1
t=0 ;w(G);w(B)
￿
is suitable for type pk
0 if it
satis￿es the constraints (6)-(8) when the prior is pk
0: Clearly, if
￿
wh;w‘￿
is an incentive
compatible mechanism, then for k = h;‘; the contract wk must be suitable for type pk
0:
11We rule out the simplest case T = 1 because the notation developed for the general case T > 2 should
be slightly modi￿ed when T = 1: However, it is straightforward to extend all the results developed in this
section to the special case T = 1:
12We return to this point at the end of the section.
18An incentive compatible mechanism must also satisfy a set of constraints which prevent
the agent from lying about his initial type. In principle, we have one constraint for each
strategy ￿ 2 ￿ since a type who lies can then choose any contingent plan of actions and
messages. However, we now show that it is without loss of generality to ignore many of
these constraints.
Consider a pair of contracts
￿
wh;w‘￿
with wk suitable for type pk
0; k = h;‘: Consider
an arbitrary type pk
0 and suppose that he chooses the contract pk0
0 ; k0 6= k; designed for the
other type. Since wk0 is suitable for pk0
0 it is easy to see that it is optimal for type pk
0 to
reveal the signal truthfully. Furthermore, any strategy in which type pk
0 guesses the state
G in some period t yields a payo￿ weakly smaller than pk
0wk0 (0) (for both claims, see the
discussion following Lemma 1 and its proof).
Let us now restrict attention to the strategies under which the agent reveals the signal
truthfully and reports the message B when he shirks. We denote this set of strategies by
￿0: Formally, a strategy ￿ belongs to ￿0 if for every t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1; every ht 2 Ht; and
every s = B;G;
￿M
t (ht;s) = s
￿M
t (ht;ne) = B
Suppose that the high type ph
0 faces the contract w‘ and that this contract is suitable
for p‘
0: It is easy to see that the optimal strategy in ￿0 for ph
0 is to acquire the signal in
every period. Consider period t and suppose that the agent acquires and reveals the signal
in every period t0 > t: The fact that w‘ is suitable for p‘
0 implies that in period t the agent
strictly prefers to work and be honest if his belief is strictly larger than p‘
t: Clearly, under
any strategy in ￿0; the high type’s belief in period t must be strictly larger than p‘
t: Thus,
any strategy in ￿0 under which the agent shirks in at least one period (on-path) is strictly
dominated by the strategy under which the agent exerts e￿ort in every period.
Suppose now that the low type p‘
0 faces the contract wh: Knowing that wh is suitable
for ph
0 is not enough to pin down the low type’s optimal strategy in ￿0: The easiest way to
see this is to consider a contract wh that satis￿es the constraint (7) for T ￿ 1 with strict
inequality: Suppose that the low type’s belief in period T ￿ 1 is smaller than ph
T￿1: Given
this limited amount of information, it is clearly impossible to determined whether the agent
prefers to acquire and reveal the signal or to shirk and announce the message B:
We summarize the discussion above about incentive compatibility in the following
lemma. Recall that given a contract w; u(t;p;w) denotes the agent’s expected utility,
computed in period t; when he acquires and reveals the signal in every period t0 > t: Also,
u(￿;p0;w) denotes the agent’s expected utility in period 0 if he follows the strategy ￿:
19Lemma 2 A mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
is incentive compatible if and only if wk is suitable for
pk
0; k = h;‘; and it satis￿es the following inequalities:
u
￿
0;pk
0;wk￿
> pk
0wk0 (0); k = h;‘; k0 6= k
u
￿
0;p
h
0;w
h￿
> u
￿
0;p
h
0;w
‘￿
u
￿
0;p‘
0;w‘￿
> u
￿
￿;p‘
0;wh￿
; ￿ 2 ￿0
The next step of our analysis is to characterize the optimal mechanisms.
3.1 The Optimal Mechanism with Asymmetric Initial Informa-
tion
The principal’s problem is given by
min
wh>0;w‘>0
￿u
￿
0;ph
0;wh￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)u
￿
0;p‘
0;w‘￿
s.t.
￿
wh;w‘￿
is incentive compatible
(10)
The problem admits a solution. To see this, notice that the principal can always o￿er
the following contract ￿ w to both types. The contract ￿ w is identical to w￿ ￿
p‘
0
￿
; the optimal
contract o￿ered to the low type when the prior p‘
0 is common knowledge, except that
￿ w(B) is such that the high type is indi￿erent between acquiring and revealing the signal
in every period and guessing the state G in period 0 (thus, ￿ w(B) > w￿ ￿
B;p‘
0
￿
). Clearly,
the contract ￿ w is suitable both for ph
0 and p‘
0. In fact, as we shall see below, when the
two beliefs ph
0 and p‘
0 are su￿ciently close to each other, it is indeed optimal to o￿er only
the contract ￿ w. However, when the di￿erence between the beliefs is su￿ciently large, the
principal prefers to o￿er two di￿erent contracts.
In general, there are multiple solutions to the principal’s problem. However, there are
some features of the contracts that are common to all optimal mechanisms. In particular,
the payments to the low type in state G coincide with the payments of the contract w￿ ￿
p‘
0
￿
:
Proposition 2 If
￿
wh;w‘￿
is an optimal mechanism then
w
‘ (t) = w
￿ ￿
t;p
‘
0
￿
for every t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1; and
w
‘ (G) = w
￿ ￿
G;p
‘
0
￿
20Among all the contracts that are suitable for p‘
0; w￿ ￿
p‘
0
￿
speci￿es the lowest payments
in state G. Consider an incentive compatible mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
and suppose that w‘ and
w￿ ￿
p‘
0
￿
do not have the same payments in state G: Suppose now that the principal lowers
the payments
￿
w‘ (t)
￿T￿1
t=0 and w‘ (G) to make them equal to the payments of w￿ ￿
p‘
0
￿
: At
the same time the principal increases the payment w‘ (B) so that the low type is indi￿erent
between the old contract w‘ and the new contract, which we call ^ w‘; when he acquires and
reveals the signal in every period.
Let us now evaluate how the change from w‘ to ^ w‘ a￿ects the utility of the high type
when he lies about his type and acquires and reveals the signal in every period. Compared
to the low type, the high type assigns higher probabilities to the payments in state G
(which are lower in ^ w‘ than in w‘) and lower probability to the payment in state B (which
is higher in ^ w‘ than in w‘). Clearly, if the low type is indi￿erent between the two contracts,
the high type must strictly prefer w‘ to ^ w‘: Thus, under the mechanism
￿
wh; ^ w‘￿
; the high
type has a strict incentive to choose the contract wh: But then the principal can lower some
of the payments of wh without making it pro￿table for the high type to imitate the low
type. Therefore, the original mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
is not optimal.
Proposition 2 shows that the payments to the low type in state G are not distorted
from the optimal mechanism w￿ ￿
p‘
0
￿
: However, the fact that the agent’s prior is private
information does have an impact on the contract of the low type.
Lemma 3 If
￿
wh;w‘￿
is an incentive compatible mechanism then
u
￿
0;p
‘
0;w
‘￿
> p
‘
0w
‘ (0)
If a contract w is suitable for some p 2 (0;1); then w(B) must be at least w￿ (B;p):
This follows from the optimality of the contract w￿ (p) when the principal and the agent
share the same prior p: Notice that w￿ (B;p) is such that an agent who has a belief equal
to zero and who acquires and reveals the signal in every period obtains a strictly positive
rent. We therefore have u(0;0;w) > 0:
Suppose that the mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
is incentive compatible. Clearly, u
￿
0;ph
0;wh￿
>
ph
0w‘ (0); i.e. the high type (weakly) prefers to acquire and reveal the signal with the
contract wh rather than guess the state G in the ￿rst period with the contract w‘: Notice
that an agent with a belief equal to zero strictly prefers the ￿rst alternative to the second
one. In fact, the agent obtains a positive rent if he works and is honest in every period (wh
is suitable for ph
0), and a payo￿ equal to zero if he guesses the state G: Finally, the agent’s
incentives are linear functions of his beliefs. Therefore, we must have u
￿
0;p;wh￿
> pw‘ (0)
for every p < ph
0:
21Given an incentive compatible mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
, the deviation under which the low
type chooses the contract w‘ and guesses the state G in the ￿rst period is not the most
pro￿table one (since u
￿
0;p‘
0;wh￿
> p‘
0w‘ (0)). Thus, the incentive u
￿
0;p‘
0;w‘￿
> p‘
0w‘ (0)
does not bind.
Taken together, Proposition 2 and Lemma 3 imply that the information rent of the low
type under an optimal mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
satis￿es
u
￿
0;p
‘
0;w
‘￿
> p
‘
0w
‘ (0) = p
‘
0w
￿ ￿
0;p
‘
0
￿
= u
￿
0;p
‘
0;w
￿ ￿
p
‘
0
￿￿
Compared to the case in which the prior p‘
0 is common knowledge, the low type obtains
a higher information rent. The additional rent comes in the form of a payment w‘ (B)
which is strictly larger than w￿ ￿
B;p‘
0
￿
.
So far we have considered the low type. We now look for general properties of the
optimal contract of the high type. The next lemma shows that in the ￿rst period the high
type must receive the same payment as the low type. Furthermore, the high type must be
indi￿erent between exerting e￿ort in every period and guessing the state G immediately.
Lemma 4 If
￿
wh;w‘￿
is an optimal mechanism then
w
h (0) = w
‘ (0) = w
￿ ￿
0;p
‘
0
￿
and
u
￿
0;p
h
0;w
h￿
= p
h
0w
h (0)
First, we provide an intuition for the second result. Suppose that u
￿
0;ph
0;wh￿
>
ph
0wh (0). If u
￿
0;p‘
0;w‘￿
= p‘
0wh (0) then the high type strictly prefers the contract wh
to the contract w‘ (formally, u
￿
0;ph
0;wh￿
> ph
0w‘ (0) and u
￿
0;ph
0;wh￿
> u
￿
0;ph
0;w‘￿
). But
then the principal can lower the payment wh (B) by a small amount and all the incentive
constraints are still satis￿ed.
Thus, let us assume that u
￿
0;p‘
0;w‘￿
> p‘
0wh (0); i.e. the constraint in which the low
type chooses wh and guesses the state G immediately is not binding. In this case the
principal can increase the value of wh (0) and decrease the value of wh (B) so that the high
type is indi￿erent between the old contract wh and the new contract, which we call ^ wh;
when he acquires and reveals the signal in every period. However, given any strategy in ￿0,
the low type is strictly worse o￿ with the contract ^ wh than with the contract wh: The logic
is similar to that of Proposition 2. The principal makes the deviations of a certain type
more costly by decreasing (increasing) the payments that the type deems relatively more
22(less) likely. Finally, the principal can also lower the payment w‘ (B) by a small amount
and the new mechanism is incentive compatible. This shows that the original mechanism ￿
wh;w‘￿
is not optimal.
Since u
￿
0;ph
0;wh￿
= ph
0wh (0); wh (0) must be weakly greater than w‘ (0) otherwise
the high type would have an incentive to choose the contract w‘ and guess the state G
immediately. In the proof we rule out the case wh (0) > w‘ (0) by showing that the principal
can lower wh (0) and some other payments of the contract wh without violating the incentive
constraints.
Lemma 4 has a number of important implications. First, notice that the information
rent of the high type is ph
0w￿ ￿
0;p‘
0
￿
and that this is larger than ph
0w￿ ￿
0;ph
0
￿
; the rent that
he obtains when the prior ph
0 is common knowledge. Thus, both types bene￿t from the
fact that their initial belief is private information. This is in contrast to many models of
adverse selection in which the principal is able to extract all the rents from a certain type.
Second, the contract o￿ered to the low type is the same among all optimal mechanisms.
Suppose that
￿
wh;w‘￿
and
￿
^ wh; ^ w‘￿
are two optimal mechanisms. Then u
￿
0;p‘
0;w‘￿
and
u
￿
0;p‘
0; ^ w‘￿
must coincide, since u
￿
0;ph
0;wh￿
and u
￿
0;ph
0; ^ wh￿
coincide. However, the con-
tracts w‘ and ^ w‘ have the same payments in state G: The low type can be indi￿erent among
w‘ and ^ w‘ (when he works in every period) if and only if w‘ (B) = ^ w‘ (B): Therefore, w‘
must be equal to ^ w‘:
Third, the solution to the principal’s problem does not depend on the probability dis-
tribution of the two types (i.e., the parameter ￿). Clearly, the set of incentive compatible
mechanisms does not vary with ￿: Lemma 4 guarantees that for every ￿ the high type
receives the same utility ph
0w￿ ￿
0;p‘
0
￿
under an optimal mechanism. Thus, the utility of the
low type must also be the same for all values of ￿:
Proposition 2, Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 identify a part of the contracts that is common
to all the optimal mechanisms. The remaining part may vary among optimal mechanisms.
Moreover, it is also a￿ected by the distance between the two priors ph
0 and p‘
0:
Recall that ￿ w denotes the contract that is identical to w￿ ￿
p‘
0
￿
; except for the value of
￿ w(B); which is such that
u
￿
0;p
h
0; ￿ w
￿
= p
h
0 ￿ w(0) = p
h
0w
￿ ￿
0;p
‘
0
￿
As mentioned above, the mechanism (￿ w; ￿ w) under which the principal o￿ers the same
contract ￿ w to both types is incentive compatible. The next proposition identi￿es necessary
and su￿cient conditions for the optimality of such a mechanism.
23Proposition 3 The mechanism (￿ w; ￿ w) is optimal if and only if p‘
0 2
￿
ph
1;ph
0
￿
: Furthermore,
if p‘
0 2
￿
ph
1;ph
0
￿
; then (￿ w; ￿ w) is the unique optimal mechanism.
Let us investigate when the principal can improve upon the mechanism ( ￿ w; ￿ w): Because
of Lemma 4 we can restrict attention to mechanisms
￿
wh;w‘￿
such that the contract wh
gives to the high type the same rent as the contract ￿ w (and wh (0) = ￿ w(0)). The mechanism ￿
wh;w‘￿
can do strictly better than (￿ w; ￿ w) only if wh (B) < ￿ w(B): In fact, if wh (B) >
￿ w(B), then an agent who has a belief smaller than ph
0 and plans to acquire and reveal the
signal in every period prefers wh to ￿ w: In particular, u
￿
0;p‘
0;wh￿
> u
￿
0;p‘
0; ￿ w
￿
: But then
w‘ must give to the low type at least the same rent as ￿ w, otherwise he has an incentive to
choose the contract wh:
Consider ￿ w and notice that given this contract it is optimal for the low type to follow
the strategy ￿1 under which he exerts e￿ort in every period t > 1 (of course, it is also
optimal to start to exert e￿ort in period zero). Suppose that the principal decreases ￿ w(B)
and increases ￿ w(1) keeping constant the high type’s rent. Let wh denote the new contract.
The change will increase (decrease) the payo￿ of the strategy ￿1 when the low type’s prior
p‘
0 is larger (smaller) than ph
1. Intuitively, let us compare the low type when he follows the
strategy ￿1 and the high type when he starts to acquire the signal in the ￿rst period. The
low type is relatively more likely to receive the larger payment wh (1) and less likely to
receive the smaller payment w(B) when his prior p‘
0 is larger than ph
1: The opposite result
holds when p‘
0 is smaller than ph
1:
This argument is su￿cient to show that (￿ w; ￿ w) is not optimal when p‘
0 < ph
1:13 To
prove the optimality of (￿ w; ￿ w) when p‘
0 > ph
1; we also need to consider changes of ￿ w which
involve the payments ￿ w(2);:::; ￿ w(T ￿ 1) and ￿ w(G): However, the same logic applies.
Any attempt to decrease ￿ w(B) and adjust the remaining payments (to keep constant the
high type’s rent) will necessarily make the low type better o￿ when he uses the strategy
￿1: More precisely, the low type is weakly better o￿ if p‘
0 = ph
1 and strictly better o￿ if
p‘
0 > ph
1: Thus, in the latter case (￿ w; ￿ w) is the unique optimal mechanism.
However, when p‘
0 6 ph
1 there are multiple optimal mechanisms. We describe one in the
next proposition. Then we brie￿y address the issue of multiplicity.
Proposition 4 Suppose that p‘
0 6 ph
1: There exists an optimal mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
which
satis￿es
w
h (B) 2
￿
w
￿ ￿
B;p
h
0
￿
;w
‘ (B)
￿
and one of the following two conditions:
13The principal can lower the payment ￿ w(B) to the low type by a small amount and he will not ￿nd it
pro￿table to choose the contract wh:
24(i) there exists ^ t 2 f1;:::;T ￿ 1g such that
wh (t) =
w￿(0;p‘
0)
￿t ; t < ^ t
wh ￿
^ t
￿
2
￿
w￿ ￿
^ t;p‘
0
￿
;
wh(^ t￿1)
￿
￿
wh (t) = w￿ ￿
t;p‘
0
￿
; t > ^ t
wh (G) = 0
(ii)
wh (t) =
w￿(0;p‘
0)
￿t ; t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1
wh (G) 2
￿
0;wh (T ￿ 1) ￿ c
￿ph
T￿1
i
In the proof we start with an arbitrary optimal mechanism
￿
^ wh; ^ w‘￿
: We let ￿ > 0
denote
￿ = u
￿
0;p
h
0; ^ w
h￿
￿ ￿u
￿
1;p
h
0; ^ w
h￿
This and the fact that ^ wh must satisfy the conditions in Lemma 4 immediately give us
the value of ^ wh (B); which is increasing in ￿ and coincides with w￿ ￿
B;ph
0
￿
when ￿ = 0
(see equation (30)).
Then we construct the mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
described in Proposition 4. Of course,
w‘ = ^ w‘ and wh (0) = ^ wh (0): We also let wh (B) = ^ wh (B): The remaining payments of
wh are determined using the following algorithm. In the ￿rst step, we let wh have the same
payments as w‘ after period one and choose wh (1) to satisfy
u
￿
0;p
h
0;w
h￿
￿ ￿u
￿
1;p
h
0;w
h￿
= ￿ (11)
If the solution wh (1) is between w‘ (1) and
w‘(0)
￿ we stop. Otherwise we let wh (1) =
w‘(0)
￿
and move to the second step. In step t; t = 2;:::;T , we let the payment wh (t0); t0 < t;
be equal to
w‘(0)
￿t0 : We also let wh have the same payments as w‘ after period t and choose
the remaining payment wh (t) (this is wh (G) if we are in step T) to solve equation (11).
Finally, we show that the resulting mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
is incentive compatible and has
the same expected cost as the original mechanism
￿
^ wh; ^ w‘￿
:
Of course, the value of wh ￿
^ t
￿
(or the value of wh (G) if
￿
wh;w‘￿
satis￿es condition (ii))
depends on ￿ which is endogenous. For the special case in which p‘
0 =
ph
0(1￿￿)t
ph
0(1￿￿)t+1￿ph
0
for
some t = 1;2;:::; it is possible to show that there exists an optimal mechanism
￿
^ wh; ^ w‘￿
such that u
￿
0;ph
0; ^ wh￿
= ￿u
￿
1;ph
0; ^ wh￿
: In other words, we can assume that ￿ is equal
25to zero. However, this is not true in general. There are examples in which ￿ is strictly
positive for any optimal mechanism.
The mechanism described in Proposition 4 has very intuitive properties. After some
period ^ t; the two contracts wh and w‘ specify the same payments in state G: However,
before ^ t the principal sets the payment of wh at their highest possible levels.14 This is
useful to separate the two types and prevent the low type from choosing the contract wh:
In fact, in the initial periods the low type is much less optimistic that he will receive a
payment in state G: Even if these initial payments are large, he will not ￿nd it pro￿table to
choose wh and exert e￿ort. As time goes on and the high type observes more signals equal
to B, his posterior gets closer to the initial belief of the low type. If the later payments
of wh are large (and su￿cient to motivate the high type) then the low type could ￿nd it
pro￿table to choose wh and start to acquire the signal after a few periods.
Suppose that the low type chooses the contract wh: Since the payments of wh after ^ t
are the same as the payments of w￿ ￿
p‘
0
￿
(the optimal contract when the prior p‘
0 is known)
and wh ￿
^ t
￿
> w￿ ￿
^ t;p‘
0
￿
; the low type does not have an incentive to shirk in ^ t;:::;T ￿ 1
(under any strategy the belief of the low type in period t must be at least p‘
t).
Before ^ t the low type may prefer to shirk. However, the decision to shirk should not be
delayed. If t < ^ t￿1; then the agent is indi￿erent between the payment wh (t) in t and the
payment wh (t + 1) in t +1: By de￿nition, they have the same discounted value. However,
the agent prefers to pay the cost c in t+1 rather than in t (this preference is strict if ￿ < 1).
To sum up, given wh it is optimal for the low type to adopt the following strategy. He
shirks in the ￿rst t periods (for some t < ^ t) and then acquires and reveals the signal in
t + 1;:::;T ￿ 1: Given this, it is easy to see why the solution to the principal’s problem
is not unique. Consider the optimal mechanism described in Proposition 4. For example,
suppose that given wh all the strategies under which the low type works in period 1 and/or
period 2 are strictly dominated. Suppose now that the principal increases wh (1) by a
small amount and decreases wh (2) to keep constant the rent of the high type. As far as
the low type is concerned, this change a￿ects only strategies that are strictly dominated.
Since the original contract wh satis￿es all the constraints (7) with strict inequality, the
new contract of the high type is still suitable for ph
0: We have therefore constructed a new
optimal mechanism.
So far we have restricted attention to contracts that are evidence-based. Allowing for
intermediate payments has no consequences for the contract of the low type. Recall that
in any optimal mechanism
￿
wh ;w‘￿
the payment w‘ (G) is equal to zero. The contract of
14Recall that wh (t) must be weakly smaller than
w
h(0)
￿t otherwise the high type could delay the an-
nouncement of the signal G. Also, notice that if the optimal mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
satis￿es condition (ii) in
Proposition 4, then all the payments wh (1);:::;wh (T ￿ 1) are set at their highest possible levels.
26the low type must be evidence-based.
Moreover, when p‘
0 > ph
1; (￿ w; ￿ w) remains the unique optimal mechanism even if we
allow for mechanisms that are not-evidence based. However, when p‘
0 6 ph
1 there are opti-
mal evidence-based mechanisms
￿
wh;w‘￿
under which all the payments of wh are strictly
positive. In this case it is possible to modify the contract wh to allow for intermediate
payments. In other words, there are optimal mechanisms under which the contract of the
high type is not evidence-based.
4 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the optimal provision of incentives in a sequential testing context. In
every period the agent can acquire costly information that is relevant to the principal’s
decision. The agent’s e￿ort and the realizations of his signals are unobservable. The
principal commits to a long-term contract that speci￿es the payments to the agent. The
optimal contract induces the agent to perform the test and reveal its outcome truthfully in
every period and minimizes his expected utility.
First, we assume that the principal and the agent are symmetrically informed at the
outset of their relationship. Under the optimal contract, the agent is indi￿erent in every
period between performing the test and shirking. Furthermore, in the ￿rst period the agent
is indi￿erent between carrying out his task and sending an uninformative message which
ends the relationship immediately. We then extend the analysis to the case in which the
agent has superior information at the time of contracting. We characterize the optimal
mechanisms and show that the contract o￿ered to the agent with a low prior is minimally
distorted. The principal prefers to o￿ers di￿erent contracts if and only if the agent’s types
are su￿ciently diverse. Finally, all the types bene￿t from their initial private information.
We view our analysis as a ￿rst step in exploring sequential testing with agency problems.
Thus, there are various ways to extend our results. Under our information structure,
the agent’s beliefs evolve in a simple way. Either the agent becomes certain that the
state is good or his belief that the state is bad increases. Of course, the literature on
sequential testing (see Wald (1947), Arrow, Blackwell, and Girshick (1949), and, more
recently, Moscarini and Smith (2001)) has analyzed much more general environments. An
obvious extension is to assume that all the realizations of the signal contain some noise.
In this case the agent’s beliefs may move in either direction over time without becoming
degenerate. If the horizon is ￿nite, the ￿nal payments could depend on the entire history of
messages, which makes the problem less tractable. It is probably more convenient to assume
an in￿nite horizon and use recursive techniques. With an in￿nite horizon the relationship
between the principal and the agent ends when the belief becomes su￿ciently small or
27su￿ciently large.
Another direction for future research is to analyze the case in which the agent has
more than two initial types. While we do not have a complete characterization of the
optimal mechanism in this case, it is easy to see that some of our results generalize. First,
the contract o￿ered to the type with the lowest belief about the good state is minimally
distorted. All the payments that this type receives in the good state coincide with the
payments that he receives when his prior is commonly known. Second, all agent types
receive an additional rent because of their initial private information.
Finally, in the paper we assume that the marginal value of each signal is so large that
the principal prefers to motivate every type of the agent to exert e￿ort in every period.
That is, the maximal length of the relationship is the same for all the types. In general,
the principal may prefer to stop testing and make a decision before the deadline if the
belief falls below a certain threshold. Of course, the number of signals (in favor of the bad
state) needed to reach the threshold depends on the agent’s initial belief. It is, therefore,
interesting to investigate the case in which the principal o￿ers contracts of various lengths
to the di￿erent types of the agent.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
We have only to prove that if a mechanism w satis￿es the constraints (6)-(8) then it is
incentive compatible.
The constraints (6)-(8) guarantee that the agent will never acquire the signal and lie
about its realization. To see this, we use the constraint (7) at T ￿ 1
0 6 u(T ￿ 1;pT￿1) ￿ ￿u(T;pT￿1) =
￿c + pT￿1￿[w(T ￿ 1) ￿ w(G)] (12)
and obtain
w(T ￿ 1) > w(G) (13)
This and the constraints (8) imply that it is optimal for the agent to tell the truth when
he observes the signal G: Clearly, any strategy in which the agent is honest after observing
the signal G and dishonest after observing the signal B is strictly dominated. The agent
can save the cost c and send the uninformed message G: In what follows, we therefore
restrict attention to strategies under which the agent reveals truthfully all the signals that
he acquires.
28Let ￿0 be a strategy that prescribes guessing the state G (i.e., shirking and announcing
the message G) in the ￿rst period. Let ^ ￿ be any strategy such that the agent guesses the
state G in some period ^ t > 0 (and this is part of the on-path behavior). We now show
that the agent weakly prefers ￿0 to ^ ￿: Let ￿1 < ::: < ￿^ k < ^ t; for some ^ k 6 ^ t; denote the ^ k
periods in which the agent acquires the signal under the strategy pro￿le ^ ￿.15 We have
u(￿0;p0) = p0w(0) >
p0￿￿
￿1w(￿1) + p0 (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
￿2w(￿2) + ::: + p0 (1 ￿ ￿)
^ k￿1 ￿￿
￿^ kw(￿^ k) + p0 (1 ￿ ￿)
^ k ￿
^ tw
￿
^ t
￿
￿
c
h
￿
￿1 + ￿
￿2 (p0 (1 ￿ ￿) + 1 ￿ p0) + ::: + ￿
￿^ k
￿
p0 (1 ￿ ￿)
^ k￿1 + 1 ￿ p0
￿i
= u(^ ￿;p0)
where the inequality follows from c > 0 and the constraints (8) (these constraints imply
w(0) > ￿
tw(t) for every t). Combining this result with the constraint (6) we obtain
u(0;p0) > u(^ ￿;p0):
It remains to consider strategies under which the agent tells the truth when he acquires
the signal and sends the message B when he shirks. The last step of the proof is to show
that the constraints (7) imply
u(t;p) > ￿u(t + 1;p) (14)
for every t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1 and every p > pt: This will be enough to conclude that the
mechanism w is incentive compatible. In fact, any strategy in which the agent shirks more
than once is strictly dominated. To see this, consider a strategy ~ ￿ under which the agent
shirks in two or more periods. Let ~ t denote the last period in which the agent shirks.
Let ~ p denote the agent’s belief in period ~ t: Because the agent has shirked at least once
before ~ t; we have ~ p > pt: Clearly, u
￿
~ t; ~ p
￿
> ￿u
￿
~ t + 1; ~ p
￿
implies that the agent has a strict
incentive to exert e￿ort in period ~ t (given that he will exert e￿ort in all future periods).
On the other hand, any strategy in which the agent shirks only once is weakly dominated
by the strategies in ￿￿ because of the constraints (7). Thus, the mechanism w is incentive
compatible.
We now prove inequality (14). One can immediately see from inequality (12) that
inequality (14) holds for t = T ￿ 1:
Given the contract w; de￿ne a(T ￿ 1;w) and b(T ￿ 1;w) as follows:
a(T ￿ 1;w) = w(B) ￿ c
b(T ￿ 1;w) = ￿w(T ￿ 1) + (1 ￿ ￿)w(G) ￿ w(B)
15Recall that we have already ruled out strategies under which the agent lies after observing the signal
G: Thus, the agent acquires the signal in period ￿k; k = 2;:::;^ k , only if he has never observed the signal
G before.
29and for every t = 0;:::;T ￿ 2 de￿ne recursively
a(t;w) = ￿c + ￿a(t + 1;w)
b(t;w) = ￿w(t) ￿ ￿￿a(t + 1;w) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b(t + 1;w) (15)
Notice that for every t and every p
u(t;p) = ￿c + p￿w(t) + (1 ￿ p￿)￿u
￿
t + 1;
p(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ p￿
￿
Using an induction argument it is easy to check that for every t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1; and
every p 2 [0;1]
u(t;p) = a(t) + b(t)p (16)
where we have dropped the argument w in a(t;w) and b(t;w) to simplify the notation.
Thus, we have
u(t;p) ￿ ￿u(t + 1;p) = a(t) ￿ ￿a(t + 1) + [b(t) ￿ ￿b(t + 1)]p
The constraints (7) imply that the above expression is non-negative when p = pt: To
conclude the proof of the lemma it is, therefore, su￿cient to show that for t = 0;:::;T ￿2
b(t) ￿ ￿b(t + 1) > 0
which is equivalent to
w(t) ￿ ￿a(t + 1) ￿ ￿b(t + 1) > 0 (17)
The above inequality is satis￿ed for t = T ￿ 2: In fact
w(T ￿ 2) ￿ ￿a(T ￿ 1) ￿ ￿b(T ￿ 1) =
w(T ￿ 2) ￿ ￿￿w(T ￿ 1) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)w(G) + ￿c =
[w(T ￿ 2) ￿ ￿w(T ￿ 1)] + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[w(T ￿ 1) ￿ w(G)] + ￿c > 0
where the inequality follows from the constraints (8), the inequality (13), and, of course,
c > 0:
We now proceed by induction. We assume that inequality (17) holds for t0 > t and
show that it also holds at t: We have
w(t) ￿ ￿a(t + 1) ￿ ￿b(t + 1) =
w(t) ￿ ￿￿w(t + 1) ￿ ￿
2 (1 ￿ ￿)[a(t + 2) + b(t + 2)] + ￿c =
[w(t) ￿ ￿w(t + 1)] + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[w(t + 1) ￿ ￿a(t + 2) ￿ ￿b(t + 2)] + ￿c > 0
30where, again, the inequality follows from the constraints (8), the induction hypothesis, and
c > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.
We start by solving a relaxed problem in which we minimize u(w) subject to the con-
straints (6) and (7). That is, we ignore the non-negativity constraints and the constraints
(8). Then we verify that the solution to the relaxed problem satis￿es them.
Given a contract w we de￿ne ~ ’(w);’(0;w);:::;’(T ￿ 1;w) as follows:
~ ’(w) = u(0;p0;w) ￿ p0w(0) =
p0
￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)w(0) + ￿
T￿1 P
t=1
(1 ￿ ￿)
t ￿
tw(t) + (1 ￿ ￿)
T ￿
T￿1w(G)
￿
+ (1 ￿ p0)￿
T￿1w(B) + ~  
and for every t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1
’(t;w) = u(t;pt;w) ￿ ￿u(t + 1;pt;w) =
pt
￿
￿w(t) ￿ ￿2
T￿1 P
t0=t+1
(1 ￿ ￿)
t0￿t￿1 ￿
t0￿tw(t0) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
T￿1￿t ￿
T￿1￿tw(G)
￿
+  t
where ~  ; 0;:::; T￿1 are T constants. ~   is the agent’s expected cost of testing when he
acquires the signal in every period. For every t;  t represents the di￿erence between the
costs of two di￿erent strategies. Under the ￿rst strategy, the agent starts to acquire the
signal in period t: Under the second strategy he shirks in period t and starts to acquire the
signal in period t + 1: For example,  T￿1 is equal to c:
We now show that if ^ w is a solution to the relaxed problem, then
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
~ ’(^ w) = 0
’(t; ^ w) = 0; t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1
^ w(G) = 0
(18)
Notice that w(B) appears only in ~ ’(w) with a positive coe￿cient. If ~ ’(^ w) > 0 then
we can lower ^ w(B) and all the constraints are still satis￿ed. Similarly, w(0) appears only
in ~ ’(w), with a negative coe￿cient, and in ’(0;w); with a positive coe￿cient. Again, if
’(0; ^ w) > 0 we can lower ^ w(0) and all the constraints are still satis￿ed. Thus, ~ ’(^ w) =
’(0; ^ w) = 0 if ^ w is a solution to the relaxed problem.
Suppose that ^ w solves the relaxed problem and ’(t; ^ w) > 0 for some t = 1;:::;T ￿ 1:
31Let ^ t denote the smallest integer for which the inequality holds. Then consider a new
contract w0 which is identical to ^ w except that we set
w0 ￿
^ t
￿
= ^ w
￿
^ t
￿
￿ "
w0 (0) = ^ w(0) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
^ t￿1 ￿
^ t"
for some small positive ": Notice that ’
￿
^ t;w0￿
> 0 for " su￿ciently small. By construction,
~ ’(w0) = ’(0;w0) = 0: For t = 1;:::;^ t ￿ 1; ’(t;w0) > ’(t; ^ w) since ’(t;w) is decreasing
in w
￿
^ t
￿
: Also, ’(t;w0) = ’(t; ^ w) for t > ^ t: Thus, the contract w0; which is cheaper than
^ w; satis￿es all the constraints of the relaxed problem.
Finally, suppose that ^ w solves the relaxed problem and ^ w(G) > 0: Consider a new
contract w0 that is identical to ^ w except that we set
w0 (G) = 0
w0 (0) = ^ w(0) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
T￿1 ￿
T￿1 ^ w(G)
We have ~ ’(w0) = ’(0;w0) = 0 and ’(t;w0) > ’(t; ^ w) for every t > 0: Thus, ^ w cannot
be a solution to the relaxed problem.
Consider now the system of linear equations (18). It is easy to check that the (unique)
solution w￿ is given by equation (9) in Proposition 1.
Clearly, all the payments in w￿ are non-negative. Also, notice that w￿ satis￿es all the
constraints (7) with equality. Consider t = 0;:::;T ￿ 2: We have
0 = u(t;pt;w￿) ￿ ￿u(t + 1;pt;w￿) =
￿c + pt￿w￿ (t) + (1 ￿ pt￿)￿u(t + 1;pt+1;w￿)+
￿c ￿ ￿pt￿w￿ (t + 1) ￿ (1 ￿ pt￿)￿
2u(t + 2;pt+1;w￿) =
￿c + pt￿w￿ (t) + ￿c ￿ ￿pt￿w￿ (t + 1)
where the last equality follows from u(t + 1;pt+1;w￿) = ￿u(t + 2;pt+1;w￿); the constraint
(7) at t + 1: The constraints (8) are therefore satis￿ed since for every t = 0;:::;T ￿ 2;
w
￿ (t) = ￿w
￿ (t + 1) +
c(1 ￿ ￿)
pt￿
Thus, the contract w￿ de￿ned in Proposition 1 solves the principal’s problem.
32Proof of Proposition 2.
Let
￿
wh;w‘￿
be an optimal mechanism and suppose that w‘ (t) 6= w￿ ￿
t;p‘
0
￿
for some t;
and/or w‘ (G) 6= w￿ ￿
G;p‘
0
￿
; where w￿ ￿
p‘
0
￿
is the optimal contract de￿ned in Proposition
1.
Let ^ w‘ denote the contract which is identical to w￿ ￿
p‘
0
￿
except that we set ^ w‘ (B) to
satisfy
u
￿
0;p
‘
0; ^ w
‘￿
= u
￿
0;p
‘
0;w
‘￿
Among all the contracts that are suitable for p‘
0; w￿ ￿
p‘
0
￿
has the lowest payments in
state G: Therefore, we have ^ w‘ (t) 6 w‘ (t) for every t; with strict inequality at t = 0;
^ w‘ (G) 6 w‘ (G); and ^ w‘ (B) > w‘ (B): Clearly, the mechanism ^ w‘ is suitable for p‘
0:
We now show that
u
￿
0;p
h
0;w
‘￿
> u
￿
0;p
h
0; ^ w
‘￿
(19)
In fact, we have
u
￿
0;ph
0;w‘￿
￿ u
￿
0;ph
0; ^ w‘￿
=
￿
u
￿
0;ph
0;w‘￿
￿ u
￿
0;p‘
0;w‘￿￿
￿
￿
u
￿
0;ph
0; ^ w‘￿
￿ u
￿
0;p‘
0; ^ w‘￿￿
=
￿
ph
0 ￿ p‘
0
￿￿
￿
T￿1 P
t=0
(1 ￿ ￿)
t ￿
tw‘ (t) + (1 ￿ ￿)
T ￿
T￿1w‘ (G) ￿ ￿
T￿1w‘ (B)
￿
￿
￿
ph
0 ￿ p‘
0
￿
￿
￿
T￿1 P
t=0
(1 ￿ ￿)
t ￿
t ^ w‘ (t) + (1 ￿ ￿)
T ￿
T￿1 ^ w‘ (G) ￿ ￿
T￿1 ^ w‘ (B)
￿
=
￿
ph
0 ￿ p‘
0
￿￿
￿
T￿1 P
t=0
(1 ￿ ￿)
t ￿
t ￿
w‘ (t) ￿ ^ w‘ (t)
￿
+
(1 ￿ ￿)
T ￿
T￿1 ￿
w‘ (G) ￿ ^ w‘ (G)
￿
￿ ￿
T￿1 ￿
w‘ (B) ￿ ^ w‘ (B)
￿i
> 0
This and the fact that the mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
is incentive compatible imply
u
￿
0;p
h
0;w
h￿
> u
￿
0;p
h
0;w
‘￿
> u
￿
0;p
h
0; ^ w
‘￿
(20)
Notice also that
u
￿
0;p
h
0;w
h￿
> p
h
0 ^ w
‘ (0) (21)
since ^ w‘ (0) < w‘ (0) and
￿
wh;w‘￿
is incentive compatible.
We now construct a contract ^ wh such that the mechanism
￿
^ wh; ^ w‘￿
is incentive com-
patible and
u
￿
0;p
h
0;w
h￿
> u
￿
0;p
h
0; ^ w
h￿
Clearly, this means that the original mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
is not optimal.
33The exact form of the contract ^ wh depends on the contract wh: We need to distinguish
among three di￿erent cases. In what follows, " denotes a small positive number.
(i) First suppose that wh (t) = w￿ ￿
t;ph
0
￿
for every t and wh (G) = w￿ ￿
G;ph
0
￿
= 0:
Notice that
w
h (0) = w
￿ ￿
0;p
h
0
￿
< w
￿ ￿
0;p
‘
0
￿
= ^ w
‘ (0) < w
‘ (0)
and, thus,
u
￿
0;p
h
0;w
h￿
> p
h
0w
‘ (0) > p
h
0w
h (0) (22)
where the ￿rst inequality follows from the fact that under
￿
wh;w‘￿
the high type does not
have an incentive to choose the contract w‘ and guess the state G in the ￿rst period.
In this case we let ^ wh be identical to wh except that we set
^ w
h (B) = w
h (B) ￿ "
It follows from inequalities (20)-(22) that for " su￿ciently small the new mechanism ￿
^ wh; ^ w‘￿
is incentive compatible.
(ii) Suppose now that there exists a period t such that the constraint
u
￿
t;p
h
t;w
h￿
> ￿u
￿
t + 1;p
h
t;w
h￿
(23)
is satis￿ed with strict inequality. In this case let ^ t denote the largest integer for which the
above constraint is not binding. If ^ t > 0; we let
^ w
h ￿
^ t
￿
= w
h ￿
^ t
￿
￿ "
and
^ w
h (t) = w
h (0) ￿ ￿￿
^ t￿t"
for t = 0;:::;^ t￿1: The remaining payments of ^ wh are equal to the corresponding payments
of wh.
If ^ t = 0; we let ^ wh be identical to wh except that we set
^ w
h (0) = w
h (0) ￿ "
For " su￿ciently small, the contract ^ wh is suitable for ph
0. It follows from inequalities
(20) and (21) that under the contract
￿
^ wh; ^ w‘￿
the high type does not have an incentive to
choose the contract ^ w‘ (provided that " is small enough). It is also obvious that the low
type does not have an incentive to choose the contract ^ wh (every payment of ^ wh is weakly
smaller than the corresponding payment of wh). We conclude that for " su￿ciently small
the mechanism
￿
^ wh; ^ w‘￿
is incentive compatible.
34(iii) Finally, suppose that the constraint (23) is binding in every period. In this case
we must have wh (G) > 0 (if wh (G) = 0 and all the constraints (23) are binding then we
are in case (i)). We let
^ w
h (G) = w
h (G) ￿ "
and
^ w
h (t) = w
h (t) ￿ ￿
T￿1￿t"
for t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1: Furthermore, ^ wh (B) = wh (B). Again, for " su￿ciently small the
mechanism
￿
^ wh; ^ w‘￿
is incentive compatible (the proof is identical to the proof of case (ii)).
Proof of Lemma 3.
Before proceeding with the proof of the lemma, we need to establish a preliminary
result. Given a contract w; recall the de￿nition of a(0;w) in equation (15) in the proof of
Lemma 1.
Claim 1 Suppose the contract w is suitable for some p0 2 (0;1): Then a(0;w) > 0:
Proof.
Fix a contract w: Recall from equation (16) that for every p 2 [0;1];
u(0;p;w) = a(0;w) + b(0;w)p
Thus, a(0;w) coincides with u(0;0;w); the agent’s expected utility in period 0 when
his belief is 0 and he acquires and reveals the signal in every period. Then we have
a(0;w) = u(0;0;w) = ￿c
￿
1 + ￿ + ::: + ￿
T￿1￿
+ ￿
T￿1w(B)
Fix a prior p0 2 (0;1) and consider the following problem:
min
w>0
w(B)
s.t. w is suitable for p0
It is immediate to check that the optimal contract w￿ (p0) solves the above problem.
We conclude that if w is suitable for p0; then
a(0;w) > a(0;w
￿ (p0)) = c
￿
1
￿(1 ￿ p0)
￿ 1
￿
> 0
This concludes the proof of the claim.
35We now continue with the proof of Lemma 3.
Suppose that the mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
is incentive compatible. It follows from a
￿
0;wh￿
>
0 (the contract wh is suitable for ph
0); and the fact that the high type does not have an
incentive to choose w‘ and guess the state G in the ￿rst period,
u
￿
0;p
h
0;w
h￿
= a
￿
0;w
h￿
+ b
￿
0;w
h￿
p
h
0 > p
h
0w
‘ (0)
that
u
￿
0;p
‘
0;w
h￿
= a
￿
0;w
h￿
+ b
￿
0;w
h￿
p
‘
0 > p
‘
0w
‘ (0)
Since the mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
is incentive compatible the low type does not have an
incentive to choose wh and acquire and reveal the signal in every period. Therefore, we
have
u
￿
0;p
‘
0;w
‘￿
> u
￿
0;p
‘
0;w
h￿
> p
‘
0w
‘ (0)
Proof of Lemma 4.
We ￿rst show that if
￿
wh;w‘￿
is an optimal mechanism, then
u
￿
0;p
h
0;w
h￿
= p
h
0w
h (0) (24)
Suppose that the mechanism is incentive compatible and u
￿
0;ph
0;wh￿
> ph
0wh (0): We
distinguish between two cases.
First suppose that
u
￿
0;p
‘
0;w
‘￿
= p
‘
0w
h (0) (25)
We know from Lemma 3 that u
￿
0;p‘
0;w‘￿
> p‘
0w‘ (0): This and equality (25) imply
wh (0) > w‘ (0): Furthermore, it follows from a
￿
0;w‘￿
> 0 (see Claim 1) and equality
(25) that u
￿
0;ph
0;w‘￿
< ph
0wh (0): Recall that u
￿
0;ph
0;wh￿
> ph
0wh (0): Thus, we have
u
￿
0;ph
0;wh￿
> ph
0w‘ (0) and u
￿
0;ph
0;wh￿
> u
￿
0;ph
0;w‘￿
: Clearly, we can lower the payment
wh (B) by a small amount and the new mechanism is still incentive compatible. This shows
that the original mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
is not optimal.
Thus, let us assume that
u
￿
0;p
‘
0;w
‘￿
> p
‘
0w
h (0) (26)
Consider now a new contract ^ wh for the high type which is identical to wh except that
we set
^ w
h (0) = w
h (0) + "
36for some small positive " and choose ^ wh (B) < wh (B) such that
u
￿
0;p
h
0; ^ w
h￿
= u
￿
0;p
h
0;w
h￿
Clearly, for " su￿ciently small the contract ^ wh is suitable for ph
0: Also, inequality (26)
implies that for " small enough, u
￿
0;p‘
0; ^ w‘￿
> p‘
0 ^ wh (0): Finally, for every ￿ 2 ￿0;
u
￿
￿;p
‘
0;w
h￿
> u
￿
￿;p
‘
0; ^ w
h￿
The proof of this inequality is identical to the proof of inequality (19), so we omit the
details.
Notice that the new mechanism
￿
^ wh;w‘￿
is incentive compatible for " su￿ciently small,
and all the constraints in which the low type lies about his type are satis￿ed with strict
inequality. Also recall from Lemma 3 that u
￿
0;p‘
0;w‘￿
> p‘
0w‘ (0): Therefore, we can
decrease the payment w‘ (B) by a small amount and the new mechanism is still incentive
compatible. But then the original mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
cannot be optimal (notice that, by
construction, the mechanisms
￿
wh;w‘￿
and
￿
^ wh;w‘￿
have the same expected cost).
Next, we show that if
￿
wh;w‘￿
is an optimal mechanism, then wh (0) = w‘ (0) =
w￿ ￿
0;p‘
0
￿
:
Suppose that the mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
is optimal. Equality (24) and the fact that ￿
wh;w‘￿
is incentive compatible immediately imply wh (0) > w‘ (0): By contradiction,
suppose that wh (0) > w‘ (0):
First, assume that u
￿
0;ph
0;wh￿
= u
￿
0;ph
0;w‘￿
: Suppose that the principal o￿ers the
mechanism
￿
w‘;w‘￿
; i.e. the same contract w‘ to both types. Since
u
￿
0;p
h
0;w
‘￿
= u
￿
0;p
h
0;w
h￿
= p
h
0w
h (0) > p
h
0w
‘ (0)
the contract w‘ is suitable for both types. However, notice that under the contract w‘ each
type strictly prefers to acquire and reveal the signal in every period rather than guess the
state G in period 0: Thus, if we lower the payment w‘ (B) by a small amount, the new
contract will remain suitable for both types. By construction, the mechanisms
￿
wh;w‘￿
and ￿
w‘;w‘￿
have the same expected cost. But then the original mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
cannot
be optimal.
To conclude the proof, suppose that
￿
wh;w‘￿
is optimal, wh (0) > w‘ (0); and u
￿
0;ph
0;wh￿
>
u
￿
0;ph
0;w‘￿
: Notice that it cannot be the case that wh (G) = 0 and wh satis￿es the con-
straint
u
￿
t;p
h
t;w
h￿
> ￿u
￿
t + 1;p
h
t;w
h￿
with equality in every period. If this were the case, then wh (0) = w￿ ￿
0;ph
0
￿
< w￿ ￿
0;p‘
0
￿
=
w‘ (0):
37If the above constraint is satis￿ed with strict inequality for some t; then we construct a
new contract ^ wh as in case (ii) in the proof of Proposition 2. Otherwise, if all the constraints
are binding, then we construct a new contract ^ wh as in case (iii) in the proof of Proposition
2.
The fact that u
￿
0;ph
0;wh￿
> u
￿
0;ph
0;w‘￿
implies that for " su￿ciently small, the new
mechanism
￿
^ wh;w‘￿
is incentive compatible. Also, the expected cost of
￿
^ wh;w‘￿
is strictly
smaller than the expected cost of the original mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
which, therefore, cannot
be optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Given a contract wh and a prior p 2 (0;1); we de￿ne
￿
￿
p;wh￿
= u
￿
0;p;wh￿
￿ u(0;p; ￿ w) =
p
￿
T￿1 P
t=0
(1 ￿ ￿)
t ￿￿
t ￿
wh (t) ￿ ￿ w(t)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
T ￿
T￿1 ￿
wh (G) ￿ ￿ w(G)
￿￿
+
(1 ￿ p)￿
T￿1 ￿
wh (B) ￿ ￿ w(B)
￿
We start with two preliminary observations. First, if a mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
is optimal,
then wh (B) 6 ￿ w(B): The proof of this result is by contradiction. Notice that if
￿
wh;w‘￿
is optimal, then ￿
￿
ph
0;wh￿
= 0: This and wh (B) > ￿ w(B) would imply ￿
￿
p‘
0;wh￿
> 0; and,
thus,
u
￿
0;p
‘;w
‘￿
> u
￿
0;p
‘;w
h￿
> u
￿
0;p
‘; ￿ w
￿
We conclude that the mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
is not optimal, since it is more expensive
than the incentive compatible mechanism (￿ w; ￿ w):
Second, it is immediate to see that if
￿
wh;w‘￿
is optimal and wh (B) = ￿ w(B); then the
mechanism (￿ w; ￿ w) is also optimal.
We are now ready to prove that (￿ w; ￿ w) is optimal when p‘
0 2
￿
ph
1;ph
0
￿
: It is enough
to show that u
￿
0;p‘
0;w‘￿
> u
￿
0;p‘
0; ￿ w
￿
for any mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
that satis￿es: (i)
u
￿
0;ph
0;wh￿
= u
￿
0;ph
0; ￿ w
￿
; (ii) wh (0) = ￿ w(0); and (iii) wh (B) < ￿ w(B):
Let ￿1 denote the strategy under which the agent shirks in the ￿rst period and acquires
and reveals the signal in every other period t > 0: Using wh (0) = ￿ w(0) we can rewrite
￿
￿
ph
0;wh￿
= 0 as
ph
0 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
T￿1 P
t=1
(1 ￿ ￿)
t￿1 ￿￿
t ￿
wh (t) ￿ ￿ w(t)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
T￿1 ￿
T￿1 ￿
wh (G) ￿ ￿ w(G)
￿￿
+
￿
1 ￿ ph
0
￿
￿
T￿1 ￿
wh (B) ￿ ￿ w(B)
￿
= 0
38We divide both sides by
￿
1 ￿ ph
0￿
￿
and obtain
ph
1
￿
T￿1 P
t=1
(1 ￿ ￿)
t￿1 ￿￿
t ￿
wh (t) ￿ ￿ w(t)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
T￿1 ￿
T￿1 ￿
wh (G) ￿ ￿ w(G)
￿￿
+
￿
1 ￿ ph
1
￿
￿
T￿1 ￿
wh (B) ￿ ￿ w(B)
￿
= 0
Recall that wh (B) < ￿ w(B) and p‘
0 > ph
1: This and the above equality imply
0 6 p‘
0
￿
T￿1 P
t=1
(1 ￿ ￿)
t￿1 ￿￿
t ￿
wh (t) ￿ ￿ w(t)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
T￿1 ￿
T￿1 ￿
wh (G) ￿ ￿ w(G)
￿￿
+
￿
1 ￿ p‘
0
￿
￿
T￿1 ￿
wh (B) ￿ ￿ w(B)
￿
= u
￿
￿1;p‘
0;wh￿
￿ u
￿
￿1;p‘
0; ￿ w
￿ (27)
Finally,
u
￿
0;p
‘
0; ￿ w
￿
= u
￿
￿
1;p
‘
0; ￿ w
￿
6 u
￿
￿
1;p
‘
0;w
h￿
6 u
￿
0;p
‘
0;w
‘￿
where the equality follows from the fact the constraint (7) is binding when the contract
is ￿ w; t = 0 and the prior is p‘
0 (notice that u
￿
￿1;p‘
0; ￿ w
￿
= ￿u
￿
1;p‘
0; ￿ w
￿
), while the last
inequality holds because
￿
wh;w‘￿
is incentive compatible.
We now turn to uniqueness. Suppose that p‘
0 2
￿
ph
1;ph
0
￿
: One can immediately check
that in this case inequality (27) is strict. Thus, if
￿
wh;w‘￿
is optimal, then wh (B) = ￿ w(B):
It is possible to show that
max
￿2￿0 u
￿
￿;p
‘
0;w
h￿
> u
￿
0;p
‘
0; ￿ w
￿
for any contract wh that satis￿es (i) u
￿
0;ph
0;wh￿
= u
￿
0;ph
0; ￿ w
￿
; (ii) wh (0) = ￿ w(0); and
(iii) wh (B) = ￿ w(B): For brevity, we omit the proof of this claim. Of course, this shows
that when p‘
1 > ph
0 there is no optimal mechanism other that (￿ w; ￿ w).
It remains to show that (￿ w; ￿ w) is not optimal when p‘
0 < ph
1: Consider the mechanism ￿
wh;w‘￿
; de￿ned as follows. Let " denote a small positive number. The contract wh is
identical to ￿ w except that we set
wh (1) = ￿ w(1) + "
wh (B) = ￿ w(B) ￿
ph
0(1￿￿)￿
(1￿ph
0)￿T￿2"
The contract w‘ is identical to ￿ w except that we set
w
‘ (B) = ￿ w(B) ￿ "
39It is easy to check that u
￿
0;ph
0;wh￿
= u
￿
0;ph
0; ￿ w
￿
and that, for " su￿ciently small, wh
is suitable for ph
0:
The fact that p‘
0 < ph
1 implies that for every ￿ 2 ￿0;
u
￿
￿;p
‘
0; ￿ w
￿
> u
￿
￿;p
‘
0;w
h￿
By de￿nition,
u
￿
0;p
‘
0; ￿ w
￿
> p
‘
0 ￿ w(0) = p
‘
0w
‘ (0) = p
‘
0w
h (0)
We conclude that for " su￿ciently small the mechanism
￿
w‘;wh￿
is incentive compatible.
Therefore, (￿ w; ￿ w) is not optimal.
Proof of Proposition 4.
We start with a preliminary observation. If
￿
^ wh; ^ w‘￿
is an optimal mechanism, then
u
￿
1;1; ^ w
h￿
> u
￿
1;1; ^ w
‘￿
(28)
where one should recall that u
￿
t;1; ^ wk￿
; t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1; denotes the agent’s expected
utility, computed in period t; when his beliefs is one, he acquires and reveals the signal in
every period t0 > t; and the contract is ^ wk: Inequality (28) follows from ^ wh (0) = ^ w‘ (0) =
w￿ ￿
0;p‘
0
￿
; and the fact that given the mechanism
￿
^ wh; ^ w‘￿
; it is not pro￿table for the type
pk
0; k = h;‘; to choose ^ wk0; k0 6= k; and acquire and reveal the signal in every period.
Let
￿
^ wh; ^ w‘￿
be an optimal contract (recall that there exists a solution to the principal’s
problem) and let ￿ > 0 be equal to
￿ = u
￿
0;p
h
0; ^ w
h￿
￿ ￿u
￿
1;p
h
0; ^ w
h￿
This and the constraints
u
￿
0;p
h
0; ^ w
h￿
= p
h
0 ^ w
h (0) = p
h
0w
￿ ￿
0;p
‘
0
￿
(29)
have the following implications:
^ w
h (B) = w
￿ ￿
B;p
h
0
￿
+
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
1 ￿ ph
0
￿
￿￿
T￿1 (30)
and
u
￿
1;1; ^ w
h￿
=
w￿ ￿
0;p‘
0
￿
￿
￿
c
ph
0￿￿
￿
￿
ph
0￿￿
(31)
From equations (29)-(31) we can derive the values of u
￿
0;p‘
0; ^ wh￿
and ￿u
￿
1;p‘
0; ^ wh￿
;
which for brevity we refer to as v0 and v1; respectively:
u
￿
0;p
‘
0; ^ w
h￿
=
￿
ph
0 ￿ p‘
0
ph
0
￿ 
￿c +
c + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
1 ￿ ph
0
￿
￿
!
+ p
‘
0w
￿ ￿
0;p
‘
0
￿
:= v0
40and
￿u
￿
1;p
‘
0; ^ w
h￿
= p
‘
0
￿
w
￿ ￿
0;p
‘
0
￿
￿
c
ph
0￿
￿
￿
ph
0￿
￿
+
￿
1 ￿ p
‘
0
￿
 
c + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
1 ￿ ph
0
￿
￿
!
:= v1
Thus, vt; t = 0;1; denotes the utility of the low type when he chooses the contract ^ wh
and he acquires and reveals the signal in every period t0 > t (before t the agent shirks and
announces the message B).
Recall from the de￿nition of u(T;p;w) in equation (5), that u
￿
T;1; ^ wh￿
is equal to
^ wh(G)
￿ : For every t = 2;:::;T; we have
u
￿
1;1; ^ w
h￿
=
t￿1 X
t0=1
(1 ￿ ￿)
t0￿1 ￿
t0￿1 ￿
￿ ^ w
h (t
0) ￿ c
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
t￿1 ￿
t￿1u
￿
t;1; ^ w
h￿
This and the fact that for every t; ^ wh (t) 6
w￿(0;p‘
0)
￿t imply
￿
tu
￿
t;1; ^ wh￿
> 1
(1￿￿)t￿1
h
w￿ ￿
0;p‘
0
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
Pt￿1
t0=1 (1 ￿ ￿)
t0￿1
￿
￿
c
ph
0￿ + c
Pt￿1
t0=1 (1 ￿ ￿)
t0￿1 ￿
t0
￿ ￿
ph
0￿
i
Finally, using this inequality and the de￿nition of ^ wh (B) in equation (30) we have that
for every t = 2;:::;T;
￿
tu
￿
t;p‘
0; ^ wh￿
= ￿
tp‘
0u
￿
t;1; ^ wh￿
+ ￿
t ￿
1 ￿ p‘
0
￿
u
￿
t;0; ^ wh￿
>
p‘
0
(1￿￿)t￿1
h
w￿ ￿
0;p‘
0
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
Pt￿1
t0=1 (1 ￿ ￿)
t0￿1
￿
￿
c
ph
0￿ + c
Pt￿1
t0=1 (1 ￿ ￿)
t0￿1 ￿
t0
￿ ￿
ph
0￿
i
+
￿
1 ￿ p‘
0
￿￿
￿c
￿
￿
t + ::: + ￿
T￿1￿
+ ￿
T￿1
￿
w￿ (B) +
(1￿￿)￿
(1￿ph
0)￿￿T￿1
￿￿
:= vt
Therefore, for t = 2;:::;T; vt is a lower bound to the utility that the lower type can
obtain when he chooses the contract ^ wh and he starts to acquire and reveal the signal in
period t (he shirks and sends the message B before t).
We conclude that under the optimal mechanism
￿
^ wh; ^ w‘￿
; the utility of the low type is
bounded below by
u
￿
0;p
‘
0; ^ w
‘￿
> maxfv0;:::;vTg (32)
We are now ready to construct an optimal mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
which satis￿es the
conditions in Proposition 4. We set w‘ = ^ w‘; wh (0) = ^ wh (0); and wh (B) = ^ wh (B): The
rest of the contract wh is constructed using an algorithm that involves T steps.
41In step 1; we set wh (t) = w￿ ￿
t;p‘
0
￿
; for t = 2;:::;T ￿ 1; and wh (G) = w￿ ￿
G;p‘
0
￿
= 0:
Also, we choose wh (1) to solve
u
￿
1;1;w
h￿
=
w￿ ￿
0;p‘
0
￿
￿
￿
c
ph
0￿￿
￿
￿
ph
0￿￿
= u
￿
1;1; ^ w
h￿
(33)
It follows from inequality (28) and the way the mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
is designed in step
1 that the solution wh (1) to the equation (33) must be weakly greater than w￿ ￿
1;p‘
0
￿
:16
If the solution wh (1) is weakly smaller than
w￿(0;p‘
0)
￿ ; then the algorithm stops at step 1:
Otherwise, we set wh (1) =
w￿(0;p‘
0)
￿ and move to step 2:
Next, we describe step t = 2;:::;T ￿ 1: We set wh (t0) =
w￿(0;p‘
0)
￿t0 for t0 < t; wh (t0) =
w￿ ￿
t0;p‘
0
￿
for t0 = t + 1;:::;T ￿ 1, and wh (G) = w￿ ￿
G;p‘
0
￿
= 0: Finally, we choose wh (t)
to solve the equation (33). If the solution wh (t) is weakly smaller than
w￿(0;p‘
0)
￿t ; then
the algorithm stops at step t: Otherwise we set wh (t) =
w￿(0;p‘
0)
￿t and move to step t + 1:
Notice that the fact that the algorithm reaches step t implies that the solution wh (t) to
the equation (33) must be greater than w￿ ￿
t;p‘
0
￿
:
Finally, in step T; we set wh (t) =
w￿(0;p‘
0)
￿t for every t = 1;:::;T ￿1; and choose wh (G)
to solve the equation (33). It is easy to check that if the algorithm reaches step T then the
solution wh (G) is positive and weakly smaller than
w
h (T ￿ 1) ￿
c
ph
T￿1￿
=
w￿ ￿
0;p‘
0
￿
￿
T￿1 ￿
c
ph
T￿1￿
We now show that the mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
is incentive compatible and
max
￿2￿0 u
￿
￿;p
‘
0;w
h￿
= maxfv0;:::;vTg (34)
Given inequality (32), this is clearly enough to conclude that the mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
is optimal.
It is immediate to see that the contracts wh and w‘ are suitable for ph
0 and p‘
0, respec-
tively.17 And since wh (0) = w‘ (0), it is not pro￿table for the type pk
0; k = h;‘; to choose
^ wk0; k0 6= k; and guess in the ￿rst period that the state is G: Also, by construction,
u
￿
0;p
h
0;w
h￿
= u
￿
0;p
h
0; ^ w
h￿
> u
￿
0;p
h
0; ^ w
‘￿
= u
￿
0;p
h
0;w
‘￿
16The solution wh (1) must be strictly greater than w￿ ￿
1;p‘
0
￿
if ￿ is equal to zero.
17Notice that if for some t; u
￿
t;ph
t ;wh￿
> ￿u
￿
t;ph
t ;wh￿
and wh (t) = ￿wh (t + 1); then it must be the
case that u
￿
t + 1;ph
t+1;wh￿
> ￿u
￿
t + 2;ph
t+1;wh￿
:
42It remains to check equality (34). Suppose that the algorithm used to construct wh stops
at step ^ t = 1;:::;T: After ^ t; the payments of wh in state G coincide with the payments
of w￿ ￿
p‘
0
￿
and wh ￿
^ t
￿
> w￿ ￿
^ t;p‘
0
￿
: Thus, the low type does not have an incentive to shirk
from period ^ t on. More formally, if ￿ 2 ￿0 is a strategy under which the low type shirks in
period t > ^ t; then there exists another strategy ￿0 2 ￿0 with u
￿
￿0;p‘
0;wh￿
> u
￿
￿;p‘
0;wh￿
:
Let us now restrict attention to the strategies in ￿0 under which the low type works in
every period t > ^ t: If ￿ is a strategy under which the agent works in period t and shirks in
some period t0; t < t0 < ^ t; then ￿ is a weakly dominated strategy. To see this, consider the
strategy ￿. We must be able to ￿nd a period ~ t < ^ t ￿ 1; such that the low type works in ~ t
and shirks in ~ t + 1: Let ￿0 be a strategy which is identical to ￿ except that the low type
shirks in ~ t and works in ~ t+1: At the beginning of period ~ t; the low type has the same belief,
say p; both when he uses ￿ and when he uses ￿0: Thus, the di￿erence between the agent’s
continuation payo￿s of the strategies ￿ and ￿0, computed at the beginning of period ~ t, is
equal to
￿c + p￿w
h ￿
~ t
￿
+ ￿c ￿ p￿￿w
h ￿
~ t + 1
￿
= ￿c + ￿c 6 0
where the equality follows from wh ￿
~ t + 1
￿
=
wh(~ t)
￿ : Thus, u
￿
￿0;p‘
0;wh￿
> u
￿
￿;p‘
0;wh￿
:
To sum up, given the contract wh; it is optimal for the low type to use one of the
following strategies: ￿0;:::;￿
^ t: For t = 0;:::;t; ￿t denotes the strategy under which the
low type starts to acquire and reveal the signal in period t (the agent shirks and sends the
message B before t). Recall that wh (t) =
w￿(0;p‘
0)
￿t for every t < ^ t since we are considering
the case in which the algorithm stops at step ^ t: Thus, for every t = 0;:::;^ t; we have
u
￿
￿
t;p
‘
0;w
h￿
= ￿
tu
￿
t;p
‘
0;w
h￿
= vt
Therefore, we conclude that the mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
is optimal.
Finally, we show that wh (1) > w￿ ￿
1;p‘
0
￿
= w‘ (1): This implies wh (B) < w‘ (B): In
fact, if wh (B) > w‘ (B) then the mechanism
￿
wh;w‘￿
is not incentive compatible (recall
that wh (t) > w‘ (t) for every t; with a strict inequality at t = 1; and wh (G) > w‘ (G)).
We need to distinguish between two cases. First, suppose that p‘
0 < ph
1: If the contract
wh constructed using the above algorithm is such that wh (1) = w￿ ￿
1;p‘
0
￿
; then it is optimal
to o￿er the same contract to both types. But this contradicts Proposition 3.
Second, suppose that p‘
0 = ph
1: It is possible to show that if p‘
0 =
ph
0(1￿￿)t
ph
0(1￿￿)t+1￿ph
0
for some
t = 1;2;:::; then there exists an optimal mechanism
￿
^ wh; ^ w‘￿
such that
u
￿
0;p
h
0; ^ w
h￿
￿ ￿u
￿
1;p
h
0; ^ w
h￿
= 0 (35)
For brevity, we omit the proof of this claim. We then start from
￿
^ wh; ^ w‘￿
and con-
struct an optimal mechanism using the above algorithm. Equality (35) guarantees that the
payment wh (1) identi￿ed in step 1 is strictly greater than w￿ ￿
1;p‘
0
￿
(see footnote 16).
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